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1287 
FORGOTTEN LESSONS FROM THE COMMON 
LAW, THE UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD 
AND TENANT ACT, AND THE HOLDOVER 
TENANT 
Property law contains some rules that have been around for centuries 
and others that have just been created. It is an evolving subject. Moreover, 
there is a fair amount of disagreement among the states on how to 
adjudicate property disputes. These differences in approach arise partly 
because property law protects multiple, conflicting goals and values and 
states have differences of opinion on how to resolve those conflicts.1 
INTRODUCTION 
With ancient concepts such as seisin and escheat,2 and relatively recent 
innovations like the implied warranty of habitability,3 property law is both 
old and new. Within this hodgepodge, disputes arise and interests clash. 
New rules are fashioned from time to time to displace the old in an attempt 
to better balance those competing interests. This interplay is particularly 
apt in the holdover-tenant situation. The holdover rule, long recognized at 
common law, imposes a harsh penalty on the unwary tenant.4 It gives a 
landlord a unilateral election to treat a tenant who remains on the premises 
after the expiration of the lease as a trespasser, or, alternatively, to consent 
to the continued occupancy and hold the tenant to a new term.5 
Importantly, this election often is available regardless of whether the 
tenant consents.6 Here is a prime situation in which various interests face 
off: a landlord has an interest in securing any rental income potentially 
disrupted by the holdover tenant, an incoming tenant seeks assurance that 
the property will be available at the start of the lease, and the tenant 
 
 
 1. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY § 1.3.1, at 9 (2001).  
 2. For seisen, see infra notes 38, 41. Escheat, a concept long identified at English common law, 
remains viable “in the United States in the sense that if a person dies intestate with no descending, 
ascending or collateral heirs, the property passes to the state.” CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN & SHELDON 
F. KURTZ, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 7, at 20 n.5 (3d ed. 2002). For an 
American case applying the concept of escheat, see, for example, In re O’Connor’s Estate, 252 N.W. 
826 (Neb. 1934).  
 3. See infra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.  
 4. See ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 2:23, at 72 
(1980) (suggesting that the severity of the sanction to the tenant outweighs the alleged benefits of the 
holdover rule).  
 5. 2 MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 18.4, at 1232 (4th ed. 1997).  
 6. Id. at 1232–33; see also infra notes 97–108 and accompanying text.  
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remaining behind has an interest in not being subjected to an abnormally 
harsh penalty against his or her will.7 Various rationales have been 
advanced for giving the landlord this choice, and various rules have been 
crafted to deal with this situation, each emphasizing different interests. 
Some favor certainty while others favor equity, and, consequently, dispute 
as to the best solution persists. 
This Note examines the treatment of the holdover tenant in the 
residential setting and, specifically, the solution promulgated by the 
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (“URLTA” or “the Act”).8 
Drafted in 1972 by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws9 in the midst of a “revolution” in landlord-tenant 
law,10 URLTA was the flagship reform.11 The Act, among other things, 
sought to free the landlord-tenant relationship from the antiquated 
common-law system and replace it with a matrix better suited to the 
modern-day residential lease.12 A successful venture, URLTA has been 
adopted, in full or in part, by several states.13 But while URLTA is largely 
salutary,14 this Note contends that with respect to holdover tenancies, 
URLTA falls short. The Act’s attempted solution to the holdover problem 
provides inadequate protection for tenants from overreaching landlords 
and, in practice, furthers no substantial interest other than the landlords’ in 
having a continuous stream of rental income. Thus, I contend, the Act fails 
to fully embrace the spirit of the revolution in landlord-tenant law. 
To fully appreciate URLTA’s treatment of the holdover tenant, it is 
important to understand the setting in which it was drafted. Accordingly, 
 
 
 7. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 4, at 72.  
 8. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT, 7B U.L.A. 531 (2000) [hereinafter 
URLTA].  
 9. Richard E. Blumberg & Brian Quinn Robbins, Beyond URLTA: A Program for Achieving 
Real Tenant Goals, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 n.5 (1976).  
 10. See infra notes 53–73 and accompanying text.  
 11. Among other things, a stated purpose of the Act was to unify residential landlord-tenant law. 
See URLTA § 1.102(b)(3). In this vein, URLTA codified several contemporary legal developments 
such as the implied warranty of habitability. Id. § 2.104 cmt.  
 12. Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, A Few Facts About the Uniform Residential 
Landlord and Tenant Act, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-urlta. 
asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2006). Indeed, one of the Act’s stated purposes is “[t]o remove the landlord 
and tenant relationship from the constraints of property law and establish it on the basis of contract 
with all concomitant rights and remedies.” Id.  
 13. See id.  
 14. Some commentators have criticized URLTA as being “only marginally effective, benefiting 
primarily middle-income tenants in the suburbs or the cities’ better neighborhoods, while largely 
failing in the aim of helping the inner-city poor and upgrading the quality of slum housing.” Samuel 
Jan Brakel & Donald M. McIntyre, The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA) in 
Operation: Two Reports, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 555, 559 (1980). 
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Part I.A briefly traces the development of the landlord-tenant relationship 
through the landlord-tenant revolution in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
In Part I.B, the common-law holdover rule is discussed, with various 
rationales advanced for it and some state attempts to solve the problem. 
Part I.C identifies the incoming tenant’s interest in having the premises 
open and alternative views on the landlord’s duty to deliver possession, as 
well as the special problems of the form lease. Next, Part D introduces 
URLTA and its various sections dealing with the holdover situation. Part 
II illustrates how landlords are able to undo those provisions to write in 
more favorable holdover provisions, and, additionally, how landlords’ 
selective use of these provisions will not promote the holdover rule’s goals 
and justifications. Part III is a proposal for change, with suggestions aimed 
at better capturing the spirit of the landlord-tenant revolution to protect 
tenants while balancing both parties’ interests.  
I. HISTORY 
Shelter is fundamental, but for many the so-called American dream of 
owning a home is neither possible nor desirable, and, as such, the 
residential lease provides a popular alternative.15 Given this prevalence, all 
states have extensive statutory and case law regulating the landlord-tenant 
relationship.16 These laws can, much of the time, reasonably be 
characterized as pro-tenant.17 A paradigmatic example is the implied 
warranty of habitability, which charges landlords with a nonwaivable 
obligation to maintain leased premises and gives tenants the right to 
withhold rent in the event of a landlord’s delinquency.18 All would agree 
that this rule is intended to benefit tenants.19 Such a notion was unknown 
 
 
 15. See Debra Pankow, To Buy or Rent? The Choice, N.D. St. Univ. Extension Serv. Publ’n FE-
241 1 (2002), available at http://www.ext.nodak.edu/extpubs/yf/fammgmt/fe241.pdf (identifying 
rising real estate prices and diminishing investment returns from home ownership). Leasing a home or 
apartment affords several advantages over purchasing, such as lower upfront and ongoing costs, fewer 
obligations regarding upkeep, and a more flexible length of term. Id. at 2–3.  
 16. See, e.g., Legal Info. Inst., State Statutes by Topic, http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/ 
state_statutes3.html#property (last visited Mar. 4, 2006) (listing various state property codes).  
 17. See Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and 
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 521 (1984) (contending that almost all changes of the 
landlord-tenant-revolution era have favored the tenant).  
 18. See SINGER, supra note 1, § 10.1 at 411–14.  
 19. Some contend, however, that pro-tenant legal rules, such as the implied warranty of 
habitability, can negatively impact tenants—and exclude potential tenants—by increasing the cost of 
doing business and ultimately lead to higher rents. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 359 (1990). Others disagree. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing 
Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution 
Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1104–10 (1971) (suggesting that rents would not rise); Mark M. Hager, 
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at common law, where caveat emptor largely predominated.20 But starting 
with a flood of reform in the late 1960s and early 1970s, tenants’ legal 
protections substantially increased.21 By recognizing that modern-day 
residential tenancies had little in common with the feudal tenancies that 
shaped this area of law and more in common with consumer transactions, 
courts and legislatures instilled some mutual dependence of lease 
covenants and also created certain minimum landlord obligations.22 
Moreover, these developments were considered radical because they 
effectively displaced centuries of common law in the course of a few 
decades—the wink of an eye in property law.23 As one commentator 
described it, “The residential tenant, long the step child of the law, has 
now become its ward and darling.”24 
 
 
The Emperor’s Clothes Are Not Efficient: Posner’s Jurisprudence of Class, 41 AMER. U. L. REV. 7, 29 
(1991) (responding to Posner’s scenario and calling it “vastly oversimplistic”). 
 20. See generally infra notes 55–72 and accompanying text.  
 21. SINGER, supra note 1, § 10.1 at 412. 
 22. Mary B. Spector, Tenant’s Rights, Procedural Wrongs: The Summary Eviction and the Need 
for Reform, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 137–38 (2000).  
 23. See David M. Becker, Eroding the Common Law Paradigm for Creation of Property 
Interests and the Hidden Costs of Law Reform, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 773, 774 n.1 (2005) (“[B]eginning 
approximately forty years ago, residential landlord-tenant law changed dramatically over a period of 
twenty years, and in terms of property history, this was the equivalent of an overnight revolution.”); 
Christopher S. Brennan, Note, The Next Step in the Evolution of the Implied Warranty of Habitability: 
Applying the Warranty to Condominiums, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3048–49 (1999) (“The [implied 
warranty of habitability] merits such accolades primarily because it usurped ancient property concepts 
that had become entrenched in the English and American legal systems over hundreds of years.”). 
However, the common-law system was in place for centuries, and some of those early traditions 
continue to shape and affect the landlord-tenant relationship today. See Spector, supra note 22, at 139 
(identifying the ancient role of status and the procedural framework that developed to protect 
freeholders from conflicting ownership claims); see also DAVID S. HILL, LANDLORD AND TENANT 
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 3–4 (3d ed. 1995) (identifying the continued importance of classifying a lease as 
personal property with regard to intestate succession, taxation, and various liens). 
 24. Rabin, supra note 17, at 519. This unprecedented increase in tenants’ rights is generally 
attributed to an attitudinal and doctrinal shift in approaching the landlord-tenant relationship—courts 
and legislatures moved away from reliance on ancient, common-law property concepts and moved 
toward reliance on contract-law concepts. See SINGER, supra note 1, § 10.1 at 412 (“The courts began 
a revolution in landlord/tenant law after several leading cases held that landlords had a contractual 
obligation to provide habitable housing. This implied obligation was based partly on reconceptualizing 
leaseholds as contractual relations and not just conveyances of real property.”); see also URLTA 
§ 1.102 cmt. (“Existing landlord-tenant law . . . is a product of English common law developed . . . at a 
time when doctrines of promissory contract were unrecognized . . . . These doctrines are inappropriate 
to modern urban conditions and inexpressive of the vital interests of the parties and the public which 
the law must protect.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/23
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A. The Early Common Law and Development of the Modern Landlord-
Tenant Relationship 
The landlord-tenant relationship developed in the time of English 
feudal landholding when leases were primarily entered into for agricultural 
and commercial rather than residential purposes.25 From the beginning, 
leases had a “hybrid legal identity,” relying on both contract and property 
law,26 but were initially dominated by property law concepts.27 That is, the 
lease was viewed primarily as a conveyance. To the extent that early 
leases were contractual arrangements, the contract was deemed executed 
upon transfer of the premises.28 Thus, the conveyance was emphasized, 
 
 
 25. See Daniel E. Wenner, Note, Renting in Collegetown, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 543, 546 (1999). 
English feudalism dates back to the Norman Conquest in 1066. See 1 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, 
THOMAS EDITION § 4.01, at 107 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994) (“[I]t can be shown that the eventual 
effect of the Norman Conquest was to achieve a considerable elaboration and uniformity of the real 
property laws governing the English and their Norman overlords.”). See generally id. §§ 4.04(a)(2), 
4.05(a). For a discussion of English landholding characteristics prior to the Norman Conquest, see id. 
§§ 2.02–3.06. Feudalism was largely a necessary response to the military reality of the times. See 
generally MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 4–5, 16–23. Feudalism describes a pyramidal system of land 
ownership with the king alone at the apex, and all land ownership originating in him. See MOYNIHAN, 
supra note 2, at 9; THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra, at 132–33 (quoting Ann Williams, The 
Land of the Conqueror, in DOMESDAY: 900 YEARS OF ENGLAND’S NORMAN HERITAGE 47–78 (1986)) 
(“England belonged to [William] in a sense in which it had never belonged to any previous king. All 
landholders, lay and ecclesiastical, were his tenants and held of him; moreover, all who held land of 
the greater tenants were also the King’s men and owed him allegiance.”). Under this system the king 
granted land to lords who then granted land to lesser tenants, with each tenant owing obligations to 
their respective lord. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 9, stating as follows: 
Directly under [the king] were the tenants-in-chief; beneath these were tenants of lower social 
standing holding the smaller parcels into which an honour or barony was sub-divided. At the 
broad base were the peasants actually tilling the soil . . . . All persons having an intermediate 
place in this structure held the land in a dual capacity—they were tenants of those above them 
and lords . . . with respect to those holding under them. 
See also Marta Wach, Note, Withholding Consent to Alienate: If Your Landlord is in a Bad Mood, Can 
He Prevent You from Alienating Your Lease?, 43 DUKE L.J. 671, 674 (1993). The nature of the 
services tenants provided to their lords had important social consequences. Not only did they establish 
“the [land]holder’s rights in the land, [but] also determined the landholder’s position—or status—
within the social system.” Spector, supra note 22, at 140. Thus, the more important the services 
rendered were deemed, the higher one’s status. Id.; see also Wenner, supra note 25, at 546 (“The 
social structure of England developed around the land tenure in which a man’s relationship to his land 
and to his lord defined his social position.”).  
 26. See A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 250 (2d ed. 1986); Wach, supra note 
25, at 676.  
 27. See Michael Madison, The Real Properties of Contract Law, 82 B.U. L. REV. 405, 410–11 
(2002) (discussing how the common-law “property approach focuses [on contract only to the extent] 
that a lease is a leasehold estate created by contract,” as opposed to the modern-day “contract 
approach” which recognizes the ongoing obligations attendant to an executory contract).  
 28. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 78; Spector, supra note 22, at 145; Wach, supra note 25, at 
677.  
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not what occurred later.29 Coupled with the landlord’s preferred position 
within the legal system, this often produced a hostile environment for 
tenants.  
Contributing to the social hierarchy was the legal “principle of seisin, 
which not only embodied the modern conception of ‘possession,’ but also 
added elements of what today might be called ‘title.’”30 The feudal system 
developed a system of estates to catalogue various holdings in land—
identified broadly as “freehold” and “nonfreehold” estates31—with the 
freeholds being those to which seisin attached,32 and the nonfreeholds 
(also called leaseholds) being those to which no seisin attached.33 A 
freeholder held a higher status than nonfreeholders and was afforded 
 
 
 29. See generally SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 4, at 1–6. A corollary result is that a tenant 
dispossessed of the land by another had recourse only in an action for damages, not for recovery of 
possession. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 77. This was thought to protect the tenants’ economic interest 
in the land, as opposed to any interest in possession. Id. However, the continued spread of the 
agricultural lease led courts to eventually give tenants a remedy of ejectment to recover possession 
from a third party that had dispossessed them. Id. at 77–78 & n.4; see also Spector, supra note 22, at 
148–49.  
 30. Spector, supra note 22, at 140. Generally, “[s]eisin is possession, but a peculiar possession—
possession of land by a man holding a freehold estate therein. Thus, seisin is much more than 
possession—it is the basis of ownership in so far as the common law admits of ownership of land.” 
MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 28. Seisin was such an important concept in feudal law that “[m]ost of 
that law concerned itself with seisin, remedies to recover seisin, and the consequences of loss of 
seisin.” Id. at 26–27. For a general discussion of seisin, see id. at 27–32; C.F. KOLBERT & N.A.M. 
MACKAY, HISTORY OF SCOTS AND ENGLISH LAND LAW 227–37 (1977). 
 31. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 33–34. Consistent with the importance of status and seisin, 
“[t]he word ‘estate’ is of feudal origin and derived from the Latin word ‘status.’” Id. at 33. Central to 
the doctrine of estates is the idea that land ownership can be measured in periods of time. Id.; cf. 
Becker, supra note 23, at 778 (“Because ownership [of land] can be divided both in terms of time and 
possession, multiple interests can be created simultaneously.”).  
 32. The freeholds include the “fee simple,” “fee tail,” and “life estate.” See MOYNIHAN, supra 
note 2, at 33–75.  
 33. The leaseholds include the “estate for years,” “periodic estate,” and “estate at will.” Id. at 76–
77. A typical lease is either an estate for years, which is defined by a duration fixed in advance (for 
example, a lease for one year), or a periodic tenancy, which is characterized by having a certain period 
(for example, a month) with additional periods of equal duration unless terminated by the landlord or 
tenant. A third type of tenancy, the tenancy at will, is an estate terminable at any time by either party 
and generally arises when no agreement as to length of the term is reached and where the parties’ 
intent as to duration cannot be implied (from, for example, a periodic rent payment). See 
SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 4, §§ 2.3–2.19. Note that in the case of a month-to-month lease, the tenancy 
does not end merely by lapse of time. A month-to-month lease generally requires notice to terminate of 
at least thirty days. Id. at 1228. An estate for years, however, will naturally terminate at the end of the 
term. JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROPERTY LAW 20 
(5th ed. 2003); see also Murray v. Cherrington, 99 Mass. 229, 230–31 (1868) (“The duration of a lease 
for years must be certain; this includes both its commencement and termination . . . . A leasehold 
interest for an uncertain and indefinite time is an estate at will only.”). Because an estate at will is 
unlikely to be accompanied by the payment of rent, it is less likely to arise in commercial, residential, 
or agricultural leases. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.19 
(3d ed. 2000).  
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protection in the courts against those who might try to take the land.34 The 
absence of seisin in leaseholds, however, left early tenants largely without 
the protection of the courts.35 The importance of seisin and the consequent 
discrepant treatment resulted from the differing roles played by each type 
of estate.36 The freehold was a family estate, providing monetary 
sustenance and stability for a household,37 but the leasehold, in contrast, 
developed primarily as an incident to monetary loans used to circumvent 
ecclesiastical prohibitions against charging interest.38  
Moreover, as the lease historically emphasized conveyance of the right 
to possess the property, any covenants were only incidental to that primary 
purpose.39 Having executed a lease, a landlord merely gave up possessory 
rights to the premises for the duration of the lease.40 At this point, the 
tenant received the bargained-for benefit and became responsible for the 
property,41 and, consequently, although the parties could create express 
 
 
 34. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 33–34. See also MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 28, 
explaining as follows: 
If O was seised of Blackacre in fee simple and B entered and ousted O, claiming a freehold 
estate therein, B now had seisin and O was disseised. O could recover seisin by making a 
peaceable entry for that purpose. If such self-help was not practical O could, as early as 1166, 
bring an assize of novel disseisin against his disseisor to recover seisin. This legal action was 
summary in nature, and judgment was entered in the King’s court on a verdict returned by a 
jury of neighbors summoned by the sheriff as directed by the writ. No question of ownership 
could be litigated, the sole issue being whether the defendant had ousted the plaintiff 
wrongfully and without judgment.  
 35. Wach, supra note 25, at 677.  
 36. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 76–77. 
 37. Id. at 77.  
 38. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 33, at 11; THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY 
OF THE COMMON LAW 572 (5th ed. 1956); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of 
Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 608–09 (2005); see also Shael Herman, Legacy and Legend: The 
Continuity of Roman and English Regulation of the Jews, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1781 (1992), stating:  
[C]anon law prohibited all loans at interest on the basis that commercial profit threatened the 
salvation of the soul. According to Catholic dogma, all usurers were “attenuated robbers” and 
perforce sinners. If a Christian died a usurer, his chattels were forfeited to the Crown and his 
lands to his feudal lord. Living Christians guilty of usury were subject to an ipso facto 
sentence of excommunication; this entailed exclusion from the Church’s sacraments and the 
company of other Christians. 
Id. at 1802 n.64 (citation omitted). Under such an arrangement, a freeholder “rich in land but short of 
cash” granted the lender a possessory interest in their estate for a period of time in exchange for a loan. 
MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 77; see also STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 74–75; Spector, 
supra note 22, at 143–44. The lender then took possession of the land and was able to recoup the loan 
principal, and interest, through income the land produced from crops and other agrarian sources. 
Spector, supra note 22, at 144.  
 39. See HILL, supra note 23, at 8.  
 40. 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 2–3.  
 41. Madison, supra note 27, at 410.  
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obligations, few implied duties were imposed on the landlord.42 The 
landlord had few inherent duties regarding services, repair, or upkeep.43 
Essentially, the lessee took possession at his or her own risk, and the 
caveat emptor mentality placed an affirmative burden on the tenant to 
sufficiently inspect the premises beforehand in order to bargain for any 
express contractual lease terms.44 But this scheme was not all-
encompassing, and two default obligations did attach. First, the landlord, 
at a minimum, had to deliver to the tenant a legal right to possession.45 
Second, the landlord had to permit the tenant quiet enjoyment of the 
premises.46 In other words, the landlord assured that the tenant had a right 
to be there and would be left alone, but little else was required.47 
The burden of caveat emptor was amplified when combined with the 
historic treatment of lease covenants as independent of one another.48 In 
essence, the tenant’s obligation to pay rent was independent of the 
landlord’s obligations.49 And under such a system, counterintuitive results 
could result. Indeed, as one writer noted, “[t]enants living with rats, 
roaches, and raw sewage often stopped paying rent only to have a court 
 
 
 42. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 94–95.  
 43. Nor did the landlord even need assure that the premises were suitable for the tenant’s 
intended use. See id. at 94 n.3 (“It is well settled that there is no implied covenant in a lease of this 
kind [lease of a dwelling house] that the premises are fit for habitation.” (quoting Stevens v. Pierce, 23 
N.E. 1006 (Mass. 1890))). In contrast, the tenant might have to make sufficient repairs to the premises 
so as not to be deemed to have committed waste. Traditionally, waste occurs when there is a 
substantial change in the property—either beneficial or harmful—on the theory that the person holding 
the reversionary interest has a right to receive the property in the same condition as when it was leased. 
See SINGER, supra note 1, at 308; see, e.g., Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 79 N.W. 738 (Wis. 1899).  
 44. See Barbara Jo Smith, Note, Tenants in Search of Parity with Consumers: Creating a 
Reasonable Expectations Warranty, 72 WASH U. L.Q. 475, 478 (1994). Such a burden was logical in 
the context of an agrarian lease because the tenant could easily inspect the land, was more interested in 
the dirt and soil than buildings, and generally had sufficient bargaining power to contract for express 
lease provisions. Id. at 479.  
 45. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 94. Courts are divided on whether actual, physical possession 
must be delivered by the landlord, or whether the mere legal right to possession is enough, although 
the majority view today is that physical possession is required. See infra Part I.C.1.  
 46. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 94, stating as follows: 
This promise meant that the tenant’s possession would be free from interference by the 
landlord, or by third persons acting under the landlord’s authority, or by the holder of a 
paramount title. In other words, landlord’s principal obligation was to assure the tenant a right 
to possession and then to leave the tenant alone.  
 47. Id.  
 48. See Smith, supra note 44, at 478. One common-law exception to independence of covenants 
was the doctrine of constructive eviction. See infra note 56; see generally MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 
96–99. 
 49. See generally 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, § 1.1. Likewise, a tenant could enforce their right to 
quiet enjoyment regardless of whether they had paid rent on time. In that situation, a landlord would 
have an action for breach of covenant, but no automatic right to recover possession of the premises. Id. 
at 3.  
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hold that they owed the withheld rent and future rental payments.”50 Taken 
to extremes, the doctrine of independent covenants mandated that even if 
the leased domicile burned down, the tenant’s obligation to pay rent would 
continue.51 In sum, “at common law the tenant had but one right—the 
right to pay rent.”52 
1.  The Revolution in Landlord-Tenant Law53 
The common-law lease-as-conveyance view, with attendant 
independent covenants and caveat emptor, was arguably viable with 
respect to agrarian leases where the lease was for the land, the tenant 
expected no services from the landlord, and the tenant was generally 
qualified to make necessary repairs.54 However, this legal framework 
became “entrenched,” and, as a result, “[r]ules meant for farm leases were 
adopted by courts in toto and applied to urban leases.”55 Such a framework 
was ill-suited for the modern residential lease. Among other reasons, the 
residential lease is not for a portion of land to be tilled but rather for part 
of a building to be lived in, which by necessity requires continuing 
obligations from the landlord such as hot water, a well-maintained roof, 
and garbage removal.56 
 
 
 50. Smith, supra note 44, at 477.  
 51. 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 2.  
 52. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 94. The doctrine of independent covenants had other 
implications. For example, a landlord faced with a tenant’s abandonment had no duty to mitigate the 
damages by finding a substitute tenant. As Milton Friedman wrote: 
[I]n the field of contracts . . . we know the wronged party may not sit by, let the damages pile 
up, and then recover for damages he [or she] could have avoided. In leases it is otherwise. 
Under what has been the majority rule . . . if a tenant signs a lease . . . and moves out during 
the term . . . [then the] landlord may leave the property vacant and recover for rent 
periodically during the term. The rule . . . is consistent with the premise that a lease is a 
conveyance rather than a contract. 
1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 1–2; see generally id. § 16.3.  
 53. Many comprehensive articles have been authored on this subject. See, e.g., Charles Donahue, 
Jr., Change in the American Law of Landlord and Tenant, 37 MOD. L. REV. 242 (1974); Mary Ann 
Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 503 (1982); Rabin, 
supra note 17.  
 54. 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 7.  
 55. Gary Goldman, Uniform Commercial Landlord and Tenant Act—A Proposal to Reform 
“Law Out of Context,” 19 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 175, 180–81 (2002).  
 56. 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 7. See generally Bruce N. Bagni, Note, The Uniform 
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: Reconciling Landlord-Tenant Law with Modern Realities, 6 
IND. L. REV. 741, 741–52 (1973). Courts did fashion a number of exceptions, however, to diminish the 
harsh applications of the common-law rules. See Goldman, supra note 55, at 182–83 and 
accompanying footnotes. For example, exceptions were created for constructive eviction, short-term 
leases of furnished premises, fraudulent concealment and failure to disclose defects, and the 
maintenance of common areas in multi-unit buildings. Id. at 183.  
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Beginning in the late 1960s, in the face of roughly 900 years’ worth of 
precedent, the law of landlord-tenant in the United States was quickly 
transformed.57 Nearly across the board, tenants’ rights were increased 
while landlords’ were decreased.58 Professor Edward Rabin has suggested 
that social unrest caused by the civil rights movement and the Vietnam 
War prompted the shift by causing individuals, courts, and legislatures to 
question the status quo.59 In addition, low-cost legal services were made 
widely available in urban centers, allowing for test cases to be brought 
defining tenants’ rights.60 As one indication of the swiftness of this 
movement, roughly fifty-six communities had formal housing codes in 
1956, yet by 1968 nearly five thousand did.61 
But prior to the landmark case of Javins v. First National Realty 
Corp.62 in 1970, despite the existence of such housing codes, few courts 
used them as guideposts by which to define tenants’ rights.63 Javins was 
decided at an opportune time, and influenced several courts to reject 
caveat emptor in favor of the implied warranty of habitability, and to reject 
the doctrine of independent covenants in favor of ongoing, mutually 
dependent obligations.64 Javins’s recharacterization of the lease from 
conveyance to contract “gave residential tenants a meaningful remedy 
against overreaching landlords for the first time in common law history,” 
namely, the ability to withhold rent.65 
The revolution swept into other areas of landlord-tenant law as well. 
For example, the era witnessed increases in landlords’ tort liability,66 
prohibitions on discriminatory renting through passage of the Fair Housing 
 
 
 57. See Donahue, supra note 53, at 242 (“The last ten years have witnessed an extraordinary 
ferment in landlord-tenant law in the United States.”); Gerald Korngold, Whatever Happened to 
Landlord-Tenant Law?, 77 NEB. L. REV. 703 (1998) (describing landlord-tenant law in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s as the “leading edge” of real property law); Rabin, supra note 17, at 519.  
 58. Rabin, supra note 17, at 519.  
 59. Id. at 540–50; see also Shelby D. Green, The Public Housing Tenancy: Variations on the 
Common Law that Give Security of Tenure and Control, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 681, 707–12 (1994).  
 60. See Goldman, supra note 55, at 183; Rabin, supra note 17, at 550–51. 
 61. Rabin, supra note 17, at 551.  
 62. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).  
 63. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 452; Rabin, supra note 17, at 552. Some courts had relied on 
housing codes to find an implied warrant of habitability prior to Javins, most notably in Pines v. 
Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409, 413 (Wis. 1961). However, Perssion did not influence other courts in the 
manner Javins did, partly because “[t]he time was not yet ripe” due to the then-existing social and 
political environment. Rabin, supra note 17, at 553; see also Madison, supra note 27, at 413–14.  
 64. See 2 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 16B.04[2], at 16B-50 to 51 
(Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2000); SINGER, supra note 1, at 452–55. 
 65. Madison, supra note 27, at 418.  
 66. Rabin, supra note 17, at 530–31.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/23
p 1287 Sullivan book Pages.doc9/24/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] COMMON LAW, URLTA, AND THE HOLDOVER TENANT 1297 
 
 
 
 
Act,67 prohibitions on retaliatory eviction for tenants complaining about 
housing code violations,68 and substantial limitations on landlords’ ability 
to use self-help to evict tenants.69 In addition, the Javins approach usurped 
common-law rules regarding such things as the landlord’s duty to deliver 
possession, the landlord’s duty to mitigate damages in the event of the 
tenant’s abandonment, and the standards to be applied in constructive 
eviction situations.70 State legislatures soon codified many of these 
changes in statutes, going so far as to “trump the bargaining process” in 
some cases to protect tenants from overreaching landlords with superior 
bargaining power.71 A comprehensive model for state legislation reflecting 
these important changes was provided by URLTA in 1972,72 and, in 
addition, a new Restatement of Property was drafted in 1977.73 
B.  The Common-Law Holdover Rule 
Following this revolution, the landlord-tenant relationship today is 
largely viewed through a pro-tenant lens. Similarly, the holdover situation 
provides a specific context in which landlord-friendly common-law rules 
were crafted, but many states later took a more pro-tenant stance. To start, 
every lease contains an express or implied agreement that upon conclusion 
of the term the tenant will give up possession of the premises.74 This flows 
logically from the presumption that it is wrong for a tenant to remain in 
possession of the premises after the lease ends.75 A tenant who remains in 
possession is deemed a “tenant at sufferance” or a “holdover tenant.”76 In 
 
 
 67. Id. at 531–33. The Fair Housing Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19 (1976 & Supp. V 
1981).  
 68. Rabin, supra note 17, at 533–34.  
 69. Id. at 537–38; see infra note 81.  
 70. See Madison, supra note 27, at 422–23 and accompanying footnotes. 
 71. Korngold, supra note 57, at 706–07 n.20; see, e.g., N.Y. REAL. PROP. LAW § 235-b(2) 
(McKinney 1989) (providing that waiver of the implied warranty of habitability is void as against 
public policy).  
 72. See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text.  
 73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT (1977).  
 74. 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord & Tenant § 352 (1995). Most leases do in fact contain express 
provisions to this effect. See 2 FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 1189, 1193.  
 75. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 33, § 6.20. For an explanation of when the various types 
of leases end, see supra note 33. In addition to quitting the premises, the tenant must generally return 
them in good condition. 2 FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 1189–90. Most leases do contain surrender 
clauses specifying the condition under which the premises are to be returned. Id. at 1193. For an in-
depth discussion of the obligations on a surrendering tenant with regard to the condition of the 
premises see id. at 1189–1217.  
 76. The terms “tenant at sufferance” and “holdover tenant” are used interchangeably. The 
tenancy at sufferance is used to distinguish the holdover tenant from one who never lawfully occupied 
the premises. See BARLOW BURKE & JOSEPH A. SNOE, PROPERTY: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 315 
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such a circumstance, the common-law holdover rule provides that “if a 
tenant remains in possession of leased quarters, after expiration of the term 
and without agreement with the landlord, [the] landlord may elect to treat 
him either as a trespasser, and begin proceedings to evict him, or to make 
him a holdover tenant, usually for a year.”77 A holdover tenant is thus in a 
precarious position.78 
Although holdover tenants wrongfully remain on the land, their initial 
lawful entry distinguishes them from a true trespasser.79 Instead, this 
situation affords the landlord options as to what course of action to take. 
Indeed, the landlord may opt to treat the holdover tenant like a trespasser 
and begin proceedings to evict him or her.80 Every state has a law 
providing for a summary judicial proceeding that allows a landlord to 
quickly evict a tenant who, for example, has failed to pay rent or holds 
over at the expiration of the lease.81 Alternatively, the landlord can consent 
to the holding over.82 
 
 
(2001); SINGER, supra note 1, § 10.3.4 at 430–31.  
 77. 2 FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 1232.  
 78. Some maintain that tenancies at sufferance are not really tenancies at all, but instead are “as 
illusory as the rings of Saturn viewed edge-on.” STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 33, § 6.20. This 
tenancy exists to avoid making a holdover tenant a probable adverse possessor. Id. Benton v. Williams, 
88 N.E. 843 (Mass. 1909), described the position of the tenant at sufferance as follows: 
A tenant at sufferance has no estate or title, but only a naked possession, without right and 
wrongfully, stands in no privity to the landlord, at common law is not liable for rent, is not 
entitled to notice to quit, and has no action against his landlord or other person entitled to 
possession, if himself, his family and goods are ejected without unnecessary force. He differs 
from a trespasser or disseisor only in that his entry upon the premises is not unlawful. His 
continued occupancy is due wholly to the laches or forbearance of the person entitled to 
possession in not evicting him. He may leave at any time without notice or liability. No 
contractual relation (apart from statute) arises out of a possession of such a character. 
Id. at 844. 
 79. In fact, the holdover tenant will not be liable in an action for trespass and continues to legally 
occupy the premises until after entry (or procedures to evict the tenant) by the landlord. See 49 AM. 
JUR. 2D Landlord & Tenant § 352 (1995); MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 92; SINGER, supra note 1, 
§ 10.3.4 at 430. 
 80. SINGER, supra note 1, § 10.3.4 at 430.  
 81. 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord & Tenant § 1003 (1995). This proceeding might be called an action 
for forcible entry and detainer, an unlawful detainer action, summary process, or summary 
dispossession, and it is generally said that the landlord must exercise this option within a reasonable 
time. Id. At common law, the landlord could use self-help to evict a tenant. See 49 AM. JUR. 2D 
Landlord & Tenant § 995 (1995). This might include changing the locks, removing the tenant’s 
personal property, or cutting off utilities in an effort to force the tenant to leave the premises. A 
majority of states now forbid self-help evictions, and such actions will likely subject a landlord to a 
lawsuit. In many states, tenants who have been forcibly evicted through self-help can recover not only 
their actual losses but also court costs, attorney fees, and the cost of temporary housing, among other 
things. For example, in Connecticut, a landlord using self-help may be prosecuted for a misdemeanor, 
and in Kentucky, a tenant can recover three months’ rent. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-214 
(2001 & Supp. 2006); KY. STAT. ANN. § 383.655 (2002 & Supp. 2005); see generally MARCIA 
STEWART ET AL., EVERY LANDLORD’S LEGAL GUIDE §§ 17/2, 17/15–17/17 (2d ed. 1997). “[With self-
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When a landlord opts to treat the holdover tenant as an ongoing tenant, 
the original lease provisions that relate to the landlord-tenant relationship 
generally carry over to the new term.83 The length of the new term is also 
generally determined by the previous lease, with some modification. If the 
previous lease was for a year or more, the new term is one year.84 If the 
previous lease was a periodic tenancy, the periodic term of less than a year 
will govern the new term.85 The amount of the tenant’s rent is one 
provision that might be changed in some circumstances. For example, the 
landlord may insist on increased rent if the tenant continues in possession, 
and the tenant, by remaining, may be found to have acquiesced to such an 
increase.86 
1.  Justifications for Giving the Landlord this Choice 
The landlord’s election is generally justified either as arising out of 
contract or as being a penalty to the individual tenant.87 As to the former—
the contractual rationale—for background one should begin in England, 
where courts “have not recognized [a unilateral] option in the landlord 
thus to hold the tenant for another period merely because he wrongfully 
retains possession [by holding to] the rule that a tenancy can be created 
only by the consent of the parties thereto.”88 English courts and a minority 
of American courts, therefore, only allow the landlord to hold the tenant 
 
 
help, the] potential for nastiness and violence is great; the last thing you want is a patrol car at the curb 
while you and your tenant wrestle over the sofa on the lawn.” Id. at 17/18.  
 82. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 4, § 2:23; see, e.g., Conway v. Starkweather, 1 Denio 113 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1845).  
 83. See Emmett S. Hickman Co. v. Am. Realty Enter., Inc., 277 A.2d 688, 689–90 (Del. 1971); 
Conway, 1 Denio at 116; see generally 2 FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 1236–37 and accompanying 
footnotes; 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord & Tenant §§ 369–76 (1995); R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Binding 
Effect on Tenant Holding Over of Covenants in Expired Lease, 49 A.L.R.2D 480 (1956); cf. Lewiston 
Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Rohde, 718 P.2d 551, 556–57 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (stating that an option-
to-purchase provision does not carry over because it does not relate to the landlord-tenant 
relationship).  
 84. Conway, 1 Denio at 116.  
 85. Id.; see also Marks v. Corliss’ Estate, 240 N.W. 71 (Mich. 1931), stating that:  
 Where one has a lease for years, with annual rent reserved, and holds over after the 
expiration of the term with the acquiescence of the landlord, the tenancy is from year to year 
on the conditions of the lease, although the annual rent is payable in monthly installments, but 
where the rent reserved is monthly, the holding over is from month to month unless the lease 
otherwise provides.  
Id. at 72 (internal citations omitted). 
 86. See, e.g., David Prop., Inc. v. Selk, 151 So.2d 334, 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).  
 87. See BURKE & SNOE, supra note 76, at 316–17. 
 88. 2 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 
§ 209, at 1471 (1912).  
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for a new term when both the landlord and tenant manifest intent to be so 
bound.89 This is merely a construction of contract principles. Certainly 
nothing prevents them from agreeing to and signing a new lease.90 Unless 
expressly forbidden or clearly against public policy, the parties are always 
free to form an agreement.91 If the parties are deemed to have reached a 
new agreement, it can even trump state statutes providing for a landlord’s 
exclusive remedy in the holdover situation, such as a statutory provision 
calling for double rent.92 
In lieu of an express agreement, such an agreement can arise by 
implication so long as the new term involves something that satisfies the 
statute of frauds.93 Problems arise with regard to implied agreements when 
one begins to wonder what constitutes an appropriate manifestation of 
assent.94 But the import of this view is in its rejection of the notion that the 
mere act of holding over is alone sufficient to manifest intent to be held to 
a new term.95 There must be something more. Some consider this view 
 
 
 89. Id.; see also BURKE & SNOE, supra note 76, at 316. 
 90. See generally TIFFANY, supra note 88, § 210.  
 91. See First Capital Inst. Real Estate, Ltd. v. Pennington, 368 S.E.2d 165, 168 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1998); cf. Gorman v. Ratliff, 712 S.W.2d 888, 891 (Ark. 1986) (invalidating a provision authorizing 
self-help); Lonergan v. Conn. Food Store, Inc., 357 A.2d 910, 913–14 (Conn. 1975) (disallowing a 
provision for perpetual renewal of the lease because it did not include an escalation of rent clause).  
 92. See Miss. State Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Howie, 449 So.2d 772, 777–79 (Miss. 1984) 
(holding that a landlord’s objective manifestation of consent created a month-to-month tenancy and 
trumped a statutory double-rent provision). For an example of a double-rent statute, see infra note 132 
(Mississippi); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-5 (2005).  
 93. The validity of oral leases is limited by the statute of frauds. In most jurisdictions, leases of 
more than one year must be in writing to be enforceable. See HILL, supra note 23, at 5; see generally 
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 6.5 (3d ed. 1999).  
 94. For instance, “[l]andlords often act, or fail to act, in ambiguous ways, so that courts have to 
resolve difficult fact questions whether the landlord treated the tenant as a continuing tenant or 
trespasser.” GRANT S. NELSON, ET AL., CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY 414 n.2 (2d ed. 2002) (citing 
Kilbourne v. Forester, 464 S.W. 2d 770 (Mo. App. 1970)). Consider the following situations: (1) The 
tenant holds over, making it known that she wishes to be a tenant for a further term. The landlord, 
however, is silent, and does not accept the rent payments. This goes on for months. It is not clear at 
what point the landlord must take action. (2) The tenant holds over and the landlord asks for rent. This 
time the tenant remains silent. (3) The tenant holds over and the landlord says, “You’re not my tenant. 
You’re a tenant at sufferance.” However, the tenant sends rent checks which the landlord accepts as 
the reasonable rental value of the premises while the tenant holds over. It is not clear in which of these 
situations an agreement will be found. In addition, if the landlord and tenant are negotiating for a 
further term before the expiration of the current lease, and fail to achieve agreement, this is evidence 
that they did not intend the further term. BURKE & SNOE, supra note 76, at 316. But if during those 
negotiations they discussed a higher rent which the landlord insisted on, then the holding over might 
be viewed as implied acceptance of the higher rent. Id.; see also supra note 86 and accompanying text.  
 95. See, e.g., Commonwealth Bldg. Corp. v. Hirschfield, 30 N.E.2d 790, 792–93 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1940) (tenant held over by ten hours and lease provided for double rent in such a circumstance); Herter 
v. Mullen, 159 N.Y. 28, 42 (N.Y. 1899) (finding that a tenant’s holding over due to mother’s sickness 
was not voluntary). 
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equitable since it attempts to ascertain the parties’ actual intent and is more 
likely to result in the formation of a periodic tenancy for the holdover 
period, as opposed to an entire additional term.96 
Alternatively, within the ambit of the penalty theory, the American 
common-law view is that the landlord has the unilateral right to make the 
determination, regardless of the tenant’s consent.97 Courts have at times 
tried to make the tenuous connection between the landlord’s choice and an 
implied-in-fact contract.98 That is, the tenant’s mere act of holding over 
creates an irrebuttable presumption that the tenant intended to extend the 
lease for another term.99 What this amounts to is a fabricated intent, with 
nothing available to overcome it.100 A more appropriate characterization of 
this view is as arising from quasi-contract, or rather, as implied by 
operation of law.101 To illustrate the havoc and inequity such a 
presumption can wreak, consider the following example: T leases 
premises from L for a term of years with rent paid annually, with the lease 
set to expire at midnight on October 1.102 Prior to the lease’s expiration, T 
informs L that he has no intent to renew the lease; in fact, T has arranged 
to rent different premises from a different landlord.103 T hires movers who 
begin moving him out on September 26.104 That same day, T becomes 
 
 
 96. See BURKE & SNOE, supra note 76, at 316; 2 TIFFANY, supra note 88, at 1471–72. 
 97. See 2 TIFFANY, supra note 88, at 1470; see also Conway v. Starkweather, 1 Denio 113, 115 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (“If [the tenant] holds over, though for a very short period, without any 
unequivocal act at the time to give his holding the character of a trespass, he is not afterwards at liberty 
to deny that he is in as a tenant, if the landlord chooses to hold him to that relation.”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 14.4 (1977); BURKE & SNOE, supra note 76, at 316, 
explaining:  
This “penalty theory” is particularly apt in rental markets where there is a so-called natural 
term. In agricultural leases, for example, the turnover at the start of the growing season is 
necessary, and the landlord who misses this date likely also misses the opportunity to rent the 
land for that year. In fact, the market for agricultural leases provides the historic origin of the 
election rule. Sometimes rental markets in the neighborhood of a college or university work 
on the same turnover principle, premise turning over between academic years.  
 98. BURKE & SNOE, supra note 76, at 316. 
 99. 2 TIFFANY, supra note 88, at 1472.  
 100. See, e.g., Mason v. Wierengo’s Estate, 71 N.W. 489 (Mich. 1897); infra notes 102–08.  
 101. 2 TIFFANY, supra note 88, at 1472. The general premise of a quasi-contract is that a person 
should not be able to retain an unsolicited benefit in a situation where a contract should have been 
formed. A typical example is the case of a plumber who installs a sprinkler system in the lawn of the 
wrong house. The owner is happy about this, but refuses to pay asserting lack of contract. Here, a court 
would likely find a quasi-contract. Cf. Glenhaven Vill., Inc. v. Kortmeyer, No. A-02-641, 2003 WL 
221225343 (Neb. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2003) (finding defendants who ceased making utilities payments 
but continued to accept services liable in quasi-contract for the value of the services they received). 
For a general description of quasi-contracts, see FARNSWORTH, supra note 93, § 2.20.  
 102. This example is based on Wierengo’s Estate, 71 N.W. at 489.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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gravely ill—so ill that he dies as a result on October 6.105 Due to the 
distraction of T’s illness and death, the move-out process is not completed 
until October 11—ten days after the lease’s expiration date.106 Despite T’s 
intention not to renew, and despite his untimely death, in this situation, a 
court held T’s estate liable for an entire additional year’s rent.107 The court 
found that liability “does not depend upon the intention of the tenant,” and 
there was “no legal reason for lifting the burden of misfortune from [the 
tenant], and imposing it upon [the landlord], who is in no way responsible 
for it.”108 By contrast, application of the previously mentioned English 
standard in this case would have produced a different result due to the 
tenant’s clear lack of assent. 
Although the unilateral election can result in a severe sanction when 
the tenant is held against his or her will, justification flows from a penalty 
and deterrence theory109 and is generally attributed to the case of A.H. 
Fetting Manufacturing Jewelry Co. v. Waltz.110 In Fetting, the court 
strongly rejected the notion that the holdover rule is based on an implied 
agreement between the parties.111 Instead, the Fetting court embraced the 
rule’s harshness and, in effect, imposed it as a form of punishment for the 
tenant’s misconduct.112 The court felt the rule “ultimately operates for the 
benefit of tenants as a class by its tendency to secure the agreed surrender 
of terms to incoming tenants,” thus creating “confidence in leasehold 
transactions.”113 Such a rule serves a dual purpose. First, it is meant to 
protect the landlord’s interest in being compensated for any lost rents from 
incoming tenants caused by the improper holding over—this is the penalty 
aspect.114 Second, it is thought that the threat of being held to another term 
gives the tenant incentive to promptly vacate, and will hence protect the 
 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 490. 
 108. Id. 
 109. SCHOSHINKSI, supra note 4, at 72.  
 110. 152 A. 434 (Md. 1930). 
 111. Id. at 435. The court stated the following: 
 The rule is sometimes stated to be based on the theory that the tenant holding over 
presumably intends to prolong the duration of his tenancy by another term, and that he cannot 
overcome this presumption by setting up, to the disadvantage of the landlord, that he is 
holding as a wrongdoer . . . . It is difficult to ascribe the liability to contract, when this 
liability exists, notwithstanding any statement, however explicit, of a contrary intention by the 
tenant.  
 112. Id. at 436 (“[T]he rule imposes a penalty upon the individual tenant.”).  
 113. Id.  
 114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.4 Introductory Note (1977).  
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incoming tenant’s interest in having the premises available—this is the 
deterrence aspect.115  
The distinction between the consensual and unilateral views may stem 
from different values placed on equity and certainty by the courts.116 
Unquestionably, one logical argument in favor of any established legal 
doctrine is certainty. Courts routinely enforce bright-line rules in the face 
of inequitable results,117 and property law is no exception. The Rule in 
Shelley’s Case, now largely abandoned,118 almost always caused harsh 
results but achieved certainty.119 Recording acts, designed to prevent fraud 
and achieve confidence as to ownership, always produce an unsympathetic 
result for someone when used.120 The chief benefits of such rules are 
notice and predictability, simplicity in application, and equality in 
treatment of similarly situated parties.121 When courts mitigate bright-line 
 
 
 115. Id.  
 116. Whether it is more desirable to have certain outcomes or equitable outcomes is a question “as 
old as the law itself.” Paul Heinrich Neuhaus, Legal Certainty Versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws, 
28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 795, 795 (1963).  
 117. See, e.g., Matisoff v. Dobi, 681 N.E.2d 376 (N.Y. 1997). Here the New York Court of 
Appeals refused Husband’s attempt to enforce a nuptial agreement, drafted by Lawyer, and entered 
into at Wife’s suggestion. Id. at 377–78. The spouses earned comparable wages when the marriage 
commenced, and both maintained separate finances throughout. Id. at 377. At the time of the divorce, 
Husband’s salary had grown to ten times that of Wife’s. Id. at 378. Wife contended at the proceedings 
that the nuptial agreement was invalid because it had not been acknowledged as required by statute. Id. 
The court agreed, stating that “a bright-line rule requiring an acknowledgment in every case is easy to 
apply and places couples and their legal advisors on clear notice of the prerequisites to a valid nuptial 
agreement.” Id. at 381.  
 118. See T.P. Gallanis, The Future of Future Interests, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 513, 535–36 
(2003).  
 119. See generally MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 181–91. The Rule provides that “[i]f a freehold 
estate is conveyed by deed or bequeathed by will to a person and in the same conveyance or will a 
remainder is limited to the heirs or to the heirs of the body of that person, that person takes both the 
freehold estate and the remainder.” Id. at 181. Suppose O conveys to A for life, then to A’s heirs. 
Absent the Rule, A merely gets a life estate, with A’s heirs holding a contingent remainder in fee 
simple. The Rule in Shelley’s Case converts the remainder in A’s heirs into a remainder in fee simple 
in A—which merges with A’s life estate—ultimately leaving A with a present estate in fee simple. A’s 
heirs are left with nothing, regardless of O’s intent. Id. at 181–82. When applied, the Rule “govern[s] 
remorselessly and without regard to specific intent or context.” David M. Becker, Debunking the 
Sanctity of Precedent, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 853, 867 (1998).  
 120. Under each of the three general types of recording acts—race, notice, and race/notice—harsh 
results can occur. Consider a race statute, which generally provides that with respect to successive 
grantees to the same piece of land the grantee who records first prevails. See JESSE DUKEMINIER, 
PROPERTY 469, 473 (Gilbert Law Summaries, Thomson 16th ed. 2002). Suppose O conveys Blackacre 
to A on Monday, and A does not immediately record. On Tuesday, O conveys Blackacre to B, and B 
immediately records. A subsequently records. B prevails, even if B had actual notice of A’s interest in 
Blackacre. Id. at 473. Similar inequities are possible under notice and race/notice statutes. Id. at 474.  
 121. See Neuhaus, supra note 116, at 795 (“[Certainty reflects] the public interest in clear, equal, 
and foreseeable rules of law which enable those who are subject to them to order their behavior in such 
a manner as to avoid legal conflict or to make clear predictions of their chances in litigation.”).  
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rules by carving out exceptions that bring in equitable concerns, these 
benefits suffer. In the end, outcomes become unpredictable and certainty is 
not achieved.122 Thus, courts adopting the unilateral election, by 
disregarding actual intent and equitable factors, place a greater value on 
certainty than on equity.123 Others have noted the inherent contradiction of 
having such a harsh rule in an otherwise tenant-friendly legal system.124 
Yet the majority of common-law courts seemed willing to sacrifice the 
equity of a single tenant for a rule allegedly, and with certain results, 
operating for the benefit of all tenants. But if that is not true—if in practice 
the rule does not function to advantage tenants as a class—the viability of 
the rule is seriously called into question, especially in light of the recent 
focus on tenants’ equitable and procedural rights. As will be discussed, it 
is unlikely that this alleged benefit is actually true given the restrictions on 
the landlord-tenant relationship imposed by URLTA. 
2.  State Solutions to the Holdover Problem and the Restatement 
(Second) 
Given the multiple interests present, the potential for harsh outcomes, 
and considerations of certainty versus equity, disagreement as to the best 
answer is reflected in the various ways states have addressed the holdover 
situation.125 Some states, such as Illinois, simply continue to give the 
landlord the unilateral choice to hold the tenant to a new term.126 This is 
 
 
 122. Consider the statute of frauds, which mandates that certain contracts, such as those for 
conveyances of interests in land, leases for one year or more, and real estate brokers’ commission 
agreements, must be in writing. Farnsworth, supra note 93; Lawrence M. Boesch, Magnificent 
Exceptions, L.A. LAW, May 2001, at 38, 38–39 (2001), available at http://www.lacba.org/ 
showpage.cfm?pageid=1249. Here, courts have crafted sweeping exceptions in the name of equity 
such as the aptly named doctrine of equitable estoppel. Id. at 38–40. Now a practicing attorney must 
master the exceptions, some the mere application of which is a question of fact determined on a case-
by-case basis. Id. at 38. One commentator notes that “[c]laims of equitable estoppel against the 
assertion of the Statute of Frauds have complicated the practice of law far beyond what law students 
could ever imagine when they study for the bar exam.” Id.  
 123. At least one early court explicitly said as much. In Haynes v. Aldrich, 31 N.E. 94, 95 (N.Y. 
1892), the court refused to except involuntary holding over from the rule, stating:  
It would introduce an uncertainty into a rule whose chief value lies in its certainty. The 
consequent confusion would be very great. Excuses would always be forthcoming, and their 
sufficiency be subject to the doubtful conclusions of a jury; and no lessor would ever know 
when he could safely promise possession to a new tenant. 
The court added, “To sustain this defense would open the door to a destruction of the 
settled doctrine, and tend to involve the rights of both lessor and lessee in uncertainty and 
confusion.” Id.  
 124. See infra note 237 and accompanying text.  
 125. See 2 FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 1231; SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 4, at 75.  
 126. See, e.g., A.O. Smith Corp. v. Kaufmann Grain Co., 596 N.E.2d 1156, 1162 (Ill. App. Ct. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/23
p 1287 Sullivan book Pages.doc9/24/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] COMMON LAW, URLTA, AND THE HOLDOVER TENANT 1305 
 
 
 
 
similar, but not identical, to the view promulgated by the Restatement 
(Second) of Property, Landlord & Tenant. The Restatement gives the 
landlord a unilateral right to impose another term based solely on the 
tenant’s holding over when there is no incoming tenant or, if there is an 
incoming tenant, gives the incoming tenant the unilateral right, with both 
elections tempered against “equitable considerations.”127 By contrast, 
some states, such as Connecticut, follow the English view by finding that 
“[h]olding over by any lessee, after the expiration of the term of his [or 
her] lease, shall not be evidence of any agreement for a further lease,”128 
and instead require further evidence of an agreement to continue the 
lease.129 Other states, such as New York, limit the length of the new term 
by calling for the creation of a month-to-month tenancy in all cases where 
a new agreement cannot be found.130 Similarly, the District of Columbia 
statute accomplishes the same month-to-month limitation by requiring 
thirty days’ notice to terminate a tenancy at sufferance.131 In addition, 
 
 
1992) (“At the sole option of the landlord, a tenant at sufferance may be evicted as a trespasser or 
treated as a holdover tenant.”) (internal citation omitted).  
 127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.4 (1977), providing as 
follows: 
 Except to the extent the parties to a lease validly agree otherwise, the landlord, if there is 
no incoming tenant, or the incoming tenant if there is one, may elect, solely on the basis of 
the tenant’s improper holding over after the termination of his lease, unilaterally to hold the 
tenant to another term, unless equitable considerations justify giving the tenant an extension 
of time to vacate the leased property and the tenant vacates the leased property before the end 
of the extended period.  
 128. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-3d (1994 & Supp. 2006). 
 129. See FJK Associates v. Karkoski, 725 A.2d 991, 993 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).  
 130. See N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 232-C (2006) (“[I]f the landlord shall accept rent [after] the 
expiration of such term, then, unless an agreement either express or implied [provides] otherwise, the 
tenancy created . . . shall be a tenancy from month to month . . . .”); see also Dashnaw v. Shiflett, No. 
C-415-2002, 2005 WL 3108213 (N.Y. App. Term Oct. 4, 2005) (“The language in the statute ‘unless 
an agreement either express or implied is made providing otherwise’ refers only to the extension of the 
duration of the holdover tenancy beyond a tenancy from month to month.”). In other words, the 
landlord’s statutory choice in New York is to evict or to create a month-to-month tenancy. 2 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 1230. However, New York cases suggest agreements can be made that 
indicate a new tenancy for something more than month-to-month. For example, in United Mutual Life 
Ins., Co. v. ICBC Corp., 410 N.Y.S.2d 292 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), the lease contained a provision 
allowing a tenant for a two-year term to renew for an additional two years. Id. at 292. After expiration 
of the original two-year term, the tenant held over by ten-and-a-half months, paying rent each month 
but at the higher rate called for under the lease. Id. at 293. The landlord wished to hold the tenant liable 
for the remainder of the two-year term, and the tenant defended on the grounds that N.Y. Real Prop. 
Law § 232-C mandated the creation of a month-to-month tenancy. Id. at 292–93. The court found that 
the provision of the lease, as well as the tenant’s paying of the increased rent called for by the new 
term, was sufficient to find “an agreement either express or implied . . . providing otherwise.” Id. at 
294 (quoting § 232-C).  
 131. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 4, at 75–76. The statute provides as follows: 
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some state statutes, such as Mississippi’s, completely abrogate the 
holdover rule by providing the sole remedy for landlords against holdover 
tenants is the payment of double rent for the time of the holding over.132 
C.  The English Rule for Delivery and the Form Lease 
1.  The Rules for Delivery of Possession 
Focusing on incoming tenants’ interest in having the premises open, 
historically a lease consisted of a transfer of the right to possess the 
premises.133 One of the early default obligations placed upon a landlord 
was the duty to deliver possession of the leased property.134 But suppose 
that when the tenant prepared to take possession of the land, it was already 
occupied by a third person, such as a holdover tenant. In such an instance, 
courts have not been in unison with respect to the exact parameters of the 
landlord’s duty to deliver possession.135 The issue that arises is whether 
the landlord is obligated to deliver actual, physical possession of the 
premises at the start of the lease, thus ensuring no third party is wrongfully 
 
 
 A tenancy by sufferance may be terminated at any time by a notice in writing from the 
landlord to the tenant to quit the premises leased, or by such notice from the tenant to the 
landlord of his [or her] intention to quit on the 30th day after the day of the service of the 
notice. If such notice expires before any periodic instalment of rent falls due, according to the 
terms of the tenancy, the landlord shall be entitled to a proportionate part of such instalment 
to the date fixed for quitting the premises. 
D.C. CODE § 42-3204 (2006). 
 132. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-7-25 (2005), providing as follows: 
 When a tenant, being lawfully notified by his [or her] landlord, shall fail or refuse to quit 
the demised premises and deliver up the same as required by the notice, or when a tenant shall 
give notice of his [or her] intention to quit the premises at a time specified, and shall not 
deliver up the premises at the time appointed, he [or she] shall, in either case, thenceforward 
pay to the landlord double the rent which he [or she] should otherwise have paid, to be levied, 
sued for, and recovered as the single rent before the giving of notice could be; and double rent 
shall continue to be paid during all the time the tenant shall so continue in possession. 
However, even where such a double-rent statute provides the landlord’s sole remedy, failure by the 
landlord to pursue this remedy in a reasonable time and acceptance of rent following the holdover may 
result in a waiver. See, e.g., Miss. State Dep’t of Public Welfare v. Howie, 449 So.2d 772 (Miss. 
1984); Sherrill v. Stewart, 23 So.2d 915 (Miss. 1945).  
 133. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 1.2 (1977) (“A landlord-
tenant relationship exists only if the landlord transfers the right to possession of the leased property.”); 
Glen Weissenberger, The Landlord’s Duty to Deliver Possession: The Overlooked Reform, 46 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 937, 937 (1977) (“The essence of a lease of real property is the transfer of the right to possess 
the leased premises from the landlord to the tenant.”).  
 134. Weissenberger, supra note 133, at 937. As a corollary, a landlord necessarily covenants that 
he has, in fact, an estate out of which a lease can be shaped, and that he will not personally prevent the 
tenant from assuming possession. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 270.  
 135. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 270.  
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in possession,136 or whether the landlord must merely ensure superior legal 
right to the premises, with no guarantee as to third parties.137 
A majority of United States jurisdictions embrace the so-called English 
Rule for delivery of possession.138 This default rule requires the landlord 
to deliver actual, physical possession of the premises,139 compelling the 
landlord to remove anyone from the property who might interfere with the 
new tenant’s entry.140 Although contemporary rationales exist for the 
English Rule,141 it is rooted in feudal traditions of seisin.142 Since a tenant 
 
 
 136. Weissenberger, supra note 133, at 937–38. 
 137. See Hannan v. Dusch, 153 S.E. 824, 826 (Va. 1930). This court aptly posed the question as 
“whether a landlord, who without any express covenant as to delivery or possession leases property to 
a tenant, is required under the law to oust trespassers and wrongdoers so as to have it open for entry by 
the tenant at the beginning of the term.” Id. at 825. Compare Hannan, 153 S.E. at 830 (adopting the 
American Rule) with Sloan v. Hart, 63 S.E. 1037, 1038 (N.C. 1909) (“[I]n the absence of an express 
provision in the lease, the lessor impliedly covenants with the lessee that the premises shall be open to 
entry by the lessee at the time fixed for the beginning of the term.”).  
 138. Matthew J. Heiser, Note, What’s Good for the Goose Isn’t Always Good for the Gander: The 
Inefficiencies of a Single Default Rule for Delivery of Possession of Leasehold Estates, 38 COLUM. J.L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 171, 174 (2004).  
 139. See Hannan, 153 S.E. at 826; 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 86.  
 140. See Weissenberger, supra note 133, at 941, stating as follows:  
The obligation of the landlord under the covenant in English rule jurisdictions is satisfied if 
the premises are open at the time the tenant’s occupancy right accrues, and once the time for 
commencement of the lease has passed, the landlord is not responsible for trespasses 
committed by third persons. After the leasehold interest has begun, the landlord’s obligations 
are governed by the covenant of quiet enjoyment which, as traditionally implied, extends only 
to the acts of the landlord himself, a person acting under the landlord’s direction, or the holder 
of a paramount title.  
Id. (internal footnotes omitted). 
 141. The Restatement (Second) identifies the following five rationales in support of the English 
Rule:  
(1) The landlord knows, or should know, the status of the possession of the leased property 
better than the tenant in the period before the date the tenant is entitled to possession. 
(2) The landlord knows, or should know, better than the tenant whether a person in possession 
of the leased property before the date the tenant is entitled to possession is properly or 
improperly on the leased property. 
(3) Before the date the tenant is entitled to possession of the leased property, the landlord is 
the only one of the two who can evict a person improperly in possession of the leased 
property. 
(4) In the situation where the person in possession of the leased property is entitled to be there 
until the date the tenant is entitled to possession, the case of the possible holdover prior 
tenant, the landlord is the only one of the two who has an opportunity to get some assurance 
that the prior tenant will not hold over. 
(5) The tenant will have received less than he bargained for if he must go forward with the 
lease and bear the cost of legal proceedings to clear the way for his entry on the leased 
property. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 6.2 cmt. a (1977). 
 142. See generally Weissenberger, supra note 133, at 942. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1287 Sullivan book Pages.doc9/24/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
1308 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1287 
 
 
 
 
was not seised of the land,143 a proxy was created that required delivery to 
and entry by the tenant.144 Both were necessary to “vest the term with the 
lessee,” but could not properly occur if a third party was already 
present.145 Because at common law the bargained-for benefit was the right 
to possession of the premises, fulfillment of the proxy was an essential 
element of the transaction.146 In this way, an English court in Coe v. Clay 
ascribed the English Rule to the notion that an entering tenant did not 
bargain for the “chance of a lawsuit.”147 This reasoning was subsequently 
adopted by Alabama in the 1880 case of King v. Reynolds,148 and other 
states soon followed the reasoning of King in applying the English Rule.149 
The landlord’s failure to deliver open premises in these jurisdictions 
has economic consequences. In this situation the incoming tenant owes no 
rent during the time he or she is kept from possession.150 In addition, 
failure to deliver possession is deemed a breach and will subject the 
landlord to an action for damages.151 These damages are comprised of 
both actual damages—the difference between the agreed-to rent and the 
fair rental value of the premises—and consequential damages, such as the 
cost of temporary housing.152 This is not as detrimental to the landlord as 
it might initially sound. Unless the incoming tenant was able to negotiate 
for a bargain rental price, most breaches of this nature “will generally 
occur at a time when there is little or no difference between the [fair] 
market value of the leasehold interest and the agreed rent,” and, 
consequently, will give rise to only nominal damages.153 Because of this 
probable result, there is a “unique justification” for imposing additional 
 
 
 143. Id.; see supra note 33 and accompanying text.  
 144. See Bloch v. Busch, 22 S.W.2d 242, 243 (Tenn. 1929). 
 145. Id. Such an event blocked entry, and the lessee therefore could not, “in fact or law,” become 
a tenant. Id.  
 146. See Weissenberger, supra note 133, at 942; see also King v. Reynolds, 67 Ala. 229, 233 (Ala. 
1880), stating that: 
A lease for a year, or a term of years, is not a freehold. It is a chattel interest. The prime 
motive of the contract is, that the lessee shall have possession; as much so, as if a chattel were 
the subject of the purchase. Delivery is one of the elements of every executed contract. When 
a chattel is sold, the thing itself is delivered. When realty is the subject, still there must be 
livery of seizin. Formerly, parties went upon the land, and there symbolical delivery was 
perfected. Now, the delivery of the deed takes the place of this symbolical delivery. 
Id. 
 147. Coe v. Clay, (1829) 130 Eng. Rep. 1131, 1131 (Ct. Common Pleas).  
 148. 67 Ala. 229 (Ala. 1880). 
 149. Heiser, supra note 138, at 177.  
 150. Weissenberger, supra note 133, at 944 & n.41.  
 151. Id. at 944.  
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 945. 
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penalties upon landlords to generate an adequate disincentive for this type 
of breach.154 
In contrast, and ironically, the so-called American Rule for delivery of 
possession is, and has always been, the minority rule in the United 
States.155 It provides that “the landlord is . . . bound only to put [the tenant] 
into legal possession, so that no obstacle in the form of a superior right of 
possession will be interposed to prevent the tenant from obtaining actual 
possession of the demised premises.”156 Justification for the American 
Rule is troublesome,157 and in jurisdictions where it is applied, an 
incoming tenant kept from possession by a holdover tenant has a remedy 
only against the holdover tenant.158 
2.  The Prevalence and Problem of the Form Lease 
Landlords and tenants may proactively address the holdover situation 
by including a provision in the lease that stipulates the parties’ rights in 
such a circumstance.159 As a bargained-for resolution, this embraces 
 
 
 154. Id.  
 155. Heiser, supra note 138, at 174. 
 156. Hannan v. Dusch, 153 S.E. 824, 828 (Va. 1930) (quoting Sloan v. Hart, 63 S.E. 1037 (N.C. 
1909)).  
 157. Some commentators point first to a misplaced reliance on the covenant of quiet enjoyment, 
under which courts obliged landlords only to the requirements of quiet enjoyment, and, second, to a 
mistaken interpretation of state dispossession statutes. See Weissenberger, supra note 133, at 948, 
stating as follows:  
Many states’ dispossession statutes are loosely worded to afford a remedy to “one entitled to 
possession.” Several American rule courts have interpreted such language as precluding the 
landlord from bringing an action and, therefore, have reasoned that no obligation to proceed 
against a third person in possession could be implied. The position suffers from circular 
reliance on the conclusion that it seeks to establish: that the landlord can escape liability by 
transferring the mere right to possession rather than actual possession.  
Id. (internal footnotes omitted). 
 158. Hannan, 153 S.E. at 828. This creates the illogical possibility that a landlord could benefit 
from a lease by demanding rent from the incoming tenant, even when the landlord knows a lingering 
tenant will obstruct possession. See Weissenberger, supra note 133, at 950. Regardless of such 
criticisms, the American Rule is still applied in a number of jurisdictions. Heiser, supra note 138, at 
175.  
 159. See, e.g., Tex. Real Estate Comm’n, Seller’s Temporary Residential Lease, O1A TREC No. 
15-3 (1998), available at http://www.trec.state.tx.us/pdf/contracts/15-3.pdf. Clause 19, entitled 
“Holding Over,” provides as follows: 
Tenant shall surrender possession of the Property upon termination of this Lease. Any 
possession by Tenant after termination creates a tenancy at sufferance and will not operate to 
renew or extend this Lease. Tenant shall pay $_______ per day during the period of any 
possession after termination as damages, in addition to any other remedies to which the 
Landlord is entitled. 
Id.; cf. United Mut. Life v. ICBC Corp., 410 N.Y.S.2d 292 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (involving a lease 
that included a provision calling for a two-year extension at tenant’s choice).  
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contract principles and accommodates the parties’ interests, but only if one 
presumes that each had an equal say in the matter. Although landlords are 
not free to include lease provisions that are unconscionable or clearly 
against public policy,160 these notions do not fully encompass the disparity 
in bargaining power that exists between landlords and tenants. The 
landlord-tenant revolution produced many beneficial changes, yet did 
surprisingly little to bolster tenants’ bargaining power with regard to 
specific lease terms.161  
The bargaining power pendulum swings almost utterly in favor of the 
landlord in the context of the standard form lease that pervades the 
American landscape.162 Certainly form leases are efficient, but problems 
with them abound. In one study, form leases from sixteen cities across the 
country were collected and analyzed.163 The study found that, of those 
leases collected, the median length was 3800 words, they often utilized 
hard-to-read typeface, and they were strongly biased in favor of 
landlords.164 On top of this, landlords continue to include many 
unenforceable provisions in leases.165 
The potential for abuse is clear. First, there is a lack of informational 
parity in the lease transaction; residential tenants are likely to be without 
sufficient knowledge and understanding to meaningfully scrutinize their 
leases.166 Moreover, the time and effort required to understand a lease or to 
 
 
 160. For an example of unconscionability, see Jaramillo v. JH Real Estate Partners, Inc., 3 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 525, 525–30 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). Lease provisions that waive a landlord’s liability are often 
voided as being against public policy. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Serv. Corp. of Ala., Inc. 453 So.2d 735 (Ala. 
1984) (holding that exculpatory clause in lease is void as against public policy when the tenant 
reported an improperly installed window to landlord and was subsequently raped by an assailant who 
entered through the window); Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 573 P.2d 465, 469 (Cal. 1978) (“In 
holding that exculpatory clauses in residential leases violate public policy, this court joins an 
increasing number of jurisdictions.”). But see Warren v. Paragon Techs. Group, 950 S.W.2d 844, 845 
(Mo. 1997) (en banc) (“Releases of future negligence are not void as against public policy, though 
they are disfavored and strictly construed.”).  
 161. See Green, supra note 59, at 712.  
 162. See Curtis J. Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 791 (1974) (“Standard 
form leases for residential and short term business tenancies appear in all urban centers.”); Donald E. 
Clocksin, Consumer Problems in the Landlord-Tenant Relationship, 9 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 572, 
572 (1974); Warren Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Empirical Study, 69 MICH. L. 
REV. 247, 247–48 (1970); see, e.g., Minn. State Bar Assoc., Minnesota Standard Residential Lease, 
Real Prop. Form. No. 41 (2000), available at http://www2.mnbar.org/sections/real-property/forms/ 
rpf41.pdf.  
 163. Berger, supra note 162, at 821. 
 164. See id. at 835 (finding strong pro-landlord elements in each lease, with a large percentage 
comprised of tenant duties and landlord remedies).  
 165. See Wenner, supra note 25, at 551 n.41.  
 166. See Berger, supra note 162, at 791; Mueller, supra note 162, at 256–63.  
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hire an attorney encourages many to opt for ignorance.167 Second, 
landlords deal with a generally captive and ready supply of renters.168 A 
residential tenant who challenges a particular lease provision can be 
replaced with a more accommodating tenant who will either agree to or 
fail to challenge the troublesome provision.169 
Compounding this problem, form leases are slow to adapt.170 For 
example, form leases continue to include unenforceable provisions 
because courts invalidate such provisions on a case-by-case basis.171 In 
other words, if a thousand form leases exist, all of which contain the same 
unenforceable provision, but only ten tenants bring suit and successfully 
challenge that provision, the provision will remain in place in the other 
990 leases.172 Upon including a favorable, unenforceable term, a landlord 
preys upon the ignorant tenant who assumes it is valid and does not think 
to challenge it.173 Thus, through "stylistic devices, [the tenant’s lack of 
information and bargaining power, and] unenforceable and illegal 
clauses,” landlords can “tether the tenant to the often unfair provisions of 
the form lease.”174 
D.  The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act 
In 1972 the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws sought “to 
simplify, clarify, modernize, and revise the law governing landlord-tenant 
relations.”175 URLTA was meant solely for residential leases,176 and it 
 
 
 167. Wenner, supra note 25, at 555. Complicating matters, parties to a lease are generally 
presumed to have read what they signed. See Warren v. Paragon Techs. Group, 950 S.W.2d 844, 846 
(Mo. 1997) (en banc). Lease provisions are also more likely to be enforced if clear and unambiguous. 
As a result, a lease may contain understandable yet detrimental provisions, and a tenant who does not 
read the lease loses the opportunity to negotiate, creating subsequent difficulty in challenging the 
provisions. See, e.g., Pool v. Insignia Residential Group, No. C-010074, 2002 WL 63535 at *4 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2002) (upholding lease provision providing for nonrefundability of security deposit); 
cf. Bedrosky v. Hiner, 430 N.W.2d 535, 539–41 (Neb. 1988) (upholding a commercial lease clause 
waiving landlord liability and stating that “[c]ourts are not free to interpret contracts which are 
couched in clear and unambiguous language”) (internal citation omitted). 
 168. Goldman, supra note 55, at 201.  
 169. See Berger, supra note 162, at 791; Mueller, supra note 162, at 264–70. 
 170. See Berger, supra note 162, at 791 n.3 (explaining how the New York City Real Estate 
Board’s form remained largely the same from 1942 to 1972).  
 171. Wenner, supra note 25, at 551.  
 172. See id. and accompanying footnotes.  
 173. See id. at 550–55.  
 174. Id. at 555.  
 175. Subcommittee on the Model Landlord-Tenant Act of Committee of Leases, Proposed 
Uniform Landlord and Tenant Act, 8 REAL PROP. & TR. J. 104 (1973). The Uniform Residential 
Landlord and Tenant Act that resulted was based on the American Bar Foundation’s Tentative Draft of 
a Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code. Id. at 104 n.2. 
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unequivocally rejected the lease-as-conveyance view in favor of the lease-
as-contract model.177 URLTA has been influential, and, as of 2004, fifteen 
states had adopted it entirely,178 five other states with some 
modification,179 and possibly more to come in the future.180 
URLTA aspires to protect tenants’ rights by creating incentives for 
landlords to improve the quality of rental housing.181 To this end, 
URLTA’s provisions codify several of the substantive developments of the 
landlord-tenant revolution.182 For example, section 2.104 adopts the 
 
 
 176. Id. See also URLTA § 1.101 cmt. However, URLTA does not apply to all residential leases, 
providing the following exceptions:  
(1) residence at an institution, public or private, if incidental to detention or the provision of 
medical, geriatric, educational, counseling, religious, or similar service;  
(2) occupancy under a contract of sale of a dwelling unit or the property of which it is a part, 
if the occupant is the purchaser or a person who succeeds to his interest;  
(3) occupancy by a member of a fraternal or social organization in the portion of a structure 
operated for the benefit of the organization;  
(4) transient occupancy in a hotel, or motel [or lodgings [subject to cite state transient 
lodgings or room occupancy excise tax act]];  
(5) occupancy by an employee of a landlord whose right to occupancy is conditional upon 
employment in and about the premises;  
(6) occupancy by an owner of a condominium unit or a holder of a proprietary lease in a 
cooperative;  
(7) occupancy under a rental agreement covering premises used by the occupant primarily for 
agricultural purposes.  
Id. § 1.202.  
 177. See Subcommittee on the Model Landlord-Tenant Act, supra note 175, at 105. 
 178. See Madison, supra note 27, at 467. These states are Alaska (ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.03.10–
34.03.380 (2004)), Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1301 to -1381 (2000)), Florida (FLA. STAT. 
§§ 83.40–.67 (2004)), Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 521-1 to -78 (2006)), Iowa (IOWA CODE 
§§ 562A.1–.37 (1992)), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-2540 to -2573 (2005)), Kentucky (KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 383.500–.715 (2002)), Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-24-101 to -442 (2005)), 
Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1401 to -1449 (2003)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. §§ 47-8-1 to -52 
(1995)), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. §§ 91-700 to -955 (2003)), Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-18-
1 to -56 (1995)), South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-40-10 to -940 (1991 & Supp. 1995)), 
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-28-101–516 (2004)), and Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.2– 
.40 (2003)).  
 179. These states are Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 47a-1 to 47a-20 (1994)), Nevada (NEV. 
REV. STAT. §§ 118A.010–530 (2000)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.01–19 (2004)), 
Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, §§ 101–35 (1999)), and Washington (WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 59.18.010–900 (2004)). 
 180.  In 2005, Alabama introduced a bill to adopt URLTA. See 2005 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2005).  
 181. URLTA § 1.102(b)(2). However, some have criticized the effectiveness of URLTA in 
accomplishing this goal. See supra note 14.  
 182. See Bagni, supra note 56, at 752, stating as follows:  
The drafters of URLTA recognized the obsolescence of traditional landlord-tenant law; 
consequently, they signaled for wholesale departures. Whereas, the common law minimized 
landlord obligations, the URLTA maximizes them; substantial affirmative duties have been 
imposed in the spirit of the judicial decisions and legislative acts [of the landlord-tenant 
revolution].  
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implied warranty of habitability183 and requires landlords to comply with 
applicable building and housing codes,184 keep the premises fit and 
habitable,185 keep all common areas safe and clean,186 maintain certain 
services and utilities,187 provide for garbage removal,188 and supply 
running water.189 A material breach of these requirements gives the tenant 
a right to terminate the lease190 or, if the breach concerns an “essential 
service” such as failure to provide heat or water, the tenant can recover 
damages or the cost of substitute housing.191 The Act also contains 
provisions prohibiting constructive eviction192 and certain retaliatory 
conduct,193 requiring the landlord to mitigate damages in the event of 
abandonment,194 and providing for waivers of the landlord’s right to 
terminate the lease.195 
In addition, URLTA gives courts some discretion to police leases. 
Section 1.303(a)(1) provides that a court may refuse to enforce a lease 
provision it finds to be unconscionable.196 In making that determination, 
the court is to consider whether “the conditions of the particular parties to 
the rental agreement, settlement or waiver of right or claim are so one-
sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances.”197 Similarly, 
URLTA specifically prohibits the inclusion of certain lease terms, a 
proactive response to the problem of form leases and the unequal 
bargaining power of the parties.198 Specifically, section 1.403 prohibits 
any lease provision in which a tenant waives or forgoes any right or 
remedy provided by the Act,199 which authorizes a tenant to confess 
judgment on a claim arising from the lease,200 which requires the tenant to 
 
 
 183. URLTA § 2.104 cmt. 
 184. Id. § 2.104(a)(1). 
 185. Id. § 2.104(a)(2). 
 186. Id. § 2.104(a)(3). 
 187. Id. § 2.104(a)(4). 
 188. Id. § 2.104(a)(5). 
 189. Id. § 2.104(a)(6). 
 190. Id. § 4.101(a). 
 191. Id. § 4.104(a)–(c). 
 192. Id. § 4.107. 
 193. Id. § 5.101(a)–(d). 
 194. Id. § 4.203(c). 
 195. Id. § 4.204. 
 196. Id. § 1.303(a).  
 197. Id. § 1.303 cmt.  
 198. Id. § 1.403 cmt. (“Rental agreements are often executed on forms provided by landlords, and 
some contain adhesion clauses the use of which is prohibited by this section.”). 
 199. Id. § 1.403(a)(1). 
 200. Id. § 1.403(a)(2). 
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pay the landlord’s legal fees,201 or which limits or indemnifies the landlord 
for liability.202 Such a lease provision is per se unenforceable, and its 
deliberate inclusion allows a tenant to recover actual damages, an 
additional sum equal to three months’ rent, and attorneys’ fees.203 
1.  URLTA and the Holdover Tenant 
The starting point for analysis of URLTA’s treatment of the holdover 
tenant is section 4.301, entitled “Periodic Tenancy; Holdover 
Remedies.”204 Subsection (c) of that section provides as follows: 
If the tenant remains in possession without the landlord’s consent 
after expiration of the term of the rental agreement or its 
termination, the landlord may bring an action for possession and if 
the tenant’s holdover is willful and not in good faith the landlord 
may also recover an amount not more than [3] month’s [sic] 
periodic rent or [threefold] the actual damages sustained by him, 
whichever is greater, and reasonable attorney’s fees. If the landlord 
consents to the tenant’s continued occupancy, Section 1.401(d) 
applies.205 
Section 4.301(c) mimics the common-law holdover rule by giving the 
landlord a choice between treating the holdover tenant as a trespasser and 
recovering damages or consenting to the continued occupancy. Section 
4.301(c) is not as explicit as the Restatement, for example, in giving the 
landlord the unilateral right to make this choice,206 but it does says that a 
new term will arise only “[i]f the landlord consents.”207 The conclusion 
that this language grants the landlord a unilateral election is bolstered by 
the absence of any other URLTA provision indicating a preference for the 
alternative consent-of-both-parties formulation; nowhere does URLTA 
require anything more than the act of holding over to suggest agreement 
for a further term.208 
 
 
 201. Id. § 1.403(a)(3). 
 202. Id. § 1.403(a)(4). 
 203. Id. § 1.403(b). 
 204. Id. § 4.301.  
 205. Id. § 4.301(c) (brackets in original). 
 206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.4 (1977) (“[T]he landlord . . . 
may elect, solely on the basis of the tenant’s improper holding over after the termination of his lease, 
unilaterally to hold the tenant to another term . . . .”).  
 207. URLTA § 4.301(c) (emphasis added). 
 208. URLTA § 1.101–6.104. By contrast, Connecticut, for example, has adopted virtually 
identical provisions to URLTA regarding the holdover situation, but specifically provides that 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/23
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Assuming the landlord consents to the holdover tenant’s continued 
occupancy, section 1.401(d) then dictates the length of the new term. That 
section states, “Unless the rental agreement fixes a definite term, the 
tenancy is week-to-week in case of a roomer who pays weekly rent, and in 
all other cases month-to-month.”209 By its terms, then, section 1.401(d) 
makes the default term of the holdover a month-to-month tenancy in all 
cases where the tenant does not pay weekly rent or where the lease does 
not provide otherwise. Notably, this is a departure from the common 
law,210 and is perhaps a compromise to mitigate the harshness of adopting 
the stricter unilateral landlord election. 
In addition, URLTA embraces the English Rule for delivery of 
possession.211 Section 2.103 provides that “[a]t the commencement of the 
term a landlord shall deliver possession of the premises to the tenant . . . . 
The landlord may bring an action for possession against any person 
wrongfully in possession and may recover the damages provided in 
section 4.301(c).”212 Similar to the common-law rule, pursuant to Section 
4.102(a), “[i]f the landlord fails to deliver possession . . . rent abates until 
possession is delivered,”213 and the incoming tenant can cancel the lease 
after five days’ written notice or demand possession and recover actual 
damages.214 As an additional incentive, section 4.102(b) allows the 
incoming tenant to recover the greater of three months’ rent or triple the 
actual damages sustained, and reasonable attorney fees, when the failure to 
deliver possession is willful and not in good faith.215 
II. ANALYSIS 
One can document the shift from the common-law system, which was 
largely geared toward the protection of status and the landlord’s superior 
 
 
“[h]olding over by any lessee, after the expiration of the term of his [or her] lease, shall not be 
evidence of any agreement for a further lease.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-3d (2004). An analogous 
provision is lacking in URLTA. 
 209. URLTA § 1.401(d). 
 210. The common-law rule provided that a tenant for a year or more could be held to a year-to-
year holdover tenancy. See supra note 84.  
 211. See Heiser, supra note 138, at 176–77; Rabin, supra note 17, at 540. 
 212. URLTA § 2.103. 
 213. Id. § 4.102(a).  
 214. Id. § 4.102(a)(1)–(2). 
 215. Id. § 4.102(b). This section provides, “If a person’s failure to deliver possession is willful and 
not in good faith,” then the incoming tenant may recover the above-mentioned damages. Id. Since 
URLTA adopts the English Rule for delivery of possession, the use of the word “person” indicates that 
the incoming tenant will have an action against the landlord only. See also URLTA § 1.301(8) 
(defining person to include “an individual or organization”).  
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property interest, to a system geared primarily toward tenant protection. 
URLTA, in keeping with this movement, was intended to provide 
increased tenant protections consistent with those that were concurrently 
being developed by state courts and legislatures. In the context of the 
holdover tenant, at first glance URLTA’s scheme mitigates the common-
law rule when the landlord binds the tenant to a new term by calling for 
the creation of a month-to-month tenancy by default. Because the 
common-law rule provided that leases of a year or more resulted in 
holdover periods of one year, while periodic tenancies resulted in the same 
periodic holdover tenancy, a default month-to-month tenancy benefits 
those tenants subject to leases of one year or more. Section 1.401(d)’s 
creation of a month-to-month tenancy might be seen as striking an 
appropriate balance between the parties’ competing interests. This result 
protects landlords from potentially foregone rents caused by the tenant’s 
holding over, protects incoming tenants by creating a disincentive for 
holding over and thereby increasing the likelihood the premises will be 
open, and, importantly, tempers these interests against the remaining 
tenant’s interest in not being subjected to an excessive term against their 
will. In addition, the creation of a month-to-month tenancy might better, 
albeit artificially, reflect the tenant’s actual intent. If a tenant for a year or 
more intended to be held for another full term, one assumes that a new 
agreement would have been reached and a new lease signed. By holding 
over and not executing a new lease, then, the tenant is deemed to intend to 
extend the lease by at most another month. The statutory creation of a 
month-to-month tenancy captures this assumption. At least facially, 
section 4.301(c) is consistent with the overall thrust of URLTA itself and 
the revolution in landlord-tenant law—increased tenant protection and 
decreased landlord privileges compared to those that existed at common 
law. 
But it is obvious the drafters of URLTA did not intend the default 
month-to-month tenancy in all cases, for they provided an obvious 
statutory loophole within section 1.401(d) to defeat this result. Once again, 
section 1.401(d), which applies to determine the length of the new 
holdover term, provides, “Unless the rental agreement fixes a definite 
term, the tenancy is week-to-week in case of a roomer who pays weekly 
rent, and in all other cases month-to-month.”216 Therefore, the creation of 
a month-to-month tenancy is merely a default rule; if the landlord desires 
to put a different and longer term in the lease, seemingly it would govern 
 
 
 216. URLTA § 1.401(d) (emphasis added). 
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the holdover situation. By way of illustration, a landlord might execute a 
lease containing the following provision: 
If the Tenant remains in possession of the premises following the 
expiration of the term and without executing a new lease, such 
holding over shall, at the sole discretion of the Landlord, be 
construed as a tenancy from year-to-year, subject to all the 
conditions, provisions, and obligations of this Lease. 
Such a provision simply and effectively rewrites section 1.401(d)’s 
default month-to-month tenancy. If the Commissioners had intended to 
limit the new tenancy to month-to-month in all cases,217 they could have 
omitted the offensive language permitting a lease provision to trump the 
statutory tenancy. The Commissioners could have written a statutory 
provision preemptively disallowing specific lease terms, as was done in 
other places,218 but here they chose to specifically cross-reference section 
4.301(c) to another provision which expressly allows the lease to 
supersede the statutory tenancy. 
The problems identified with form leases and bargaining power 
discrepancies indicate that it would be surprisingly easy for a landlord to 
include such a provision if so desired. As mentioned, the revolution in 
landlord-tenant law increased tenants’ protections in several ways but did 
little to alleviate the disparate bargaining power between the parties. In the 
context of the form lease, where various provisions are set in place ahead 
of time by the landlord, this discrepancy is magnified. Here, with section 
1.401(d)’s blessing, the landlord can include a defeating lease provision 
and the average tenant will likely not read or understand it, or, 
alternatively, will fail to negotiate around it. The potential result is that a 
boilerplate provision, as above, could make its way into the form leases of 
URLTA jurisdictions and only be challenged on a case-by-case basis. 
If such a hypothetical provision is challenged, although URLTA in 
places tips its hat to notions of good faith and unconscionability,219 there is 
a unique and verisimilar risk that it would be enforceable. First, such a 
lease provision is not expressly prohibited by URLTA. Although section 
 
 
 217. Week-to-week tenants are excluded. Id.  
 218. See supra notes 198–203 and accompanying text.  
 219. See URLTA § 1.302; see also id. § 1.103, providing: 
Unless displaced by the provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the 
law relating to capacity to contract, mutuality of obligations, principal and agent, real 
property, public health, safety and fire prevention, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, 
coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause supplement its 
provisions. 
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1.403 identifies several per se unenforceable provisions, none relate to 
sections 4.301(c) or 1.401(d) or regulate the length of a holdover term. In 
fact, just the opposite is true. The language of section 1.401(d) actually 
welcomes such a provision.220 It is clear the Commissioners explicitly 
recognized the bargaining-power disparity inherent in the landlord-tenant 
relationship. The comment to section 1.403 indicates that the 
Commissioners were well aware of the problems of the form lease, stating 
that “[r]ental agreements are often executed on forms provided by 
landlords, and some contain adhesion clauses the use of which is 
prohibited by this section.”221 Yet they chose not to trump the bargaining 
process and declare provisions invalid unless the offensive covenant 
relates to a more traditionally fundamental tenant right, such as waiver of 
the warranty of habitability or a landlord’s tort liability. These two 
factors—the lack of a prohibitory statutory provision and section 
1.401(d)’s express mandate that such a lease term is permissible—strongly 
indicate that, instead, the Commissioners felt it wise to leave such a choice 
to the agreement of the parties, circumscribed only by unconscionability. 
Yet it is problematic to conclude that such a provision would be 
deemed unconscionable. Even if it were challenged, the hypothetical 
provision calling for a year-to-year holdover period is clear and 
unambiguous, and tenants can generally be presumed to have read and 
understood the lease. Even traditionally antiholdover states like New 
York, which provides for a statutory month-to-month tenancy, have 
recognized the ability of a precisely drawn lease provision to nullify the 
statute in favor of a term substantially longer.222 In effect, what the 
landlord accomplishes through this provision is merely to preserve within 
a lease the result that was mandated at common law—that is, the ability to 
hold a tenant who has a lease term of a year or longer, who wrongfully 
remains in possession, to an additional year-to-year tenancy. By contrast, 
the landlord’s inclusion of a lease provision calling for a holdover period 
of five years, for example, is more uncertain. Such a provision carries a 
higher presumption of unconscionability given that no court, even at 
common law, recognized the ability of a landlord to bind a holdover tenant 
for anything greater than one year.223 The year-to-year term simply does 
 
 
 220. Since § 1.401(d) limits the maximum default tenancy to month-to-month “[u]nless the rental 
agreement fixes a definite term,” one can assume by negative implication that the drafters anticipated 
rental agreement holdover terms longer than month-to-month. URLTA § 401(d).  
 221. URLTA § 1.401(d) cmt.  
 222. See United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. ICBC Corp., 410 N.Y.S.2d 292 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).   
 223. See 2 TIFFANY, supra note 88, at 1470. 
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not rise to the level of the five-year term in departing from common-law 
precedent, nor is it categorically similar to that class of cases where courts 
have trumped the bargaining process and held lease provisions 
unconscionable.224 Thus, section 4.301(c), by way of section 1.401(d), 
enables landlords to utilize enforceable holdover provisions akin to those 
obtainable by default at common law, with the same results criticized as 
overly severe. 
The preceding demonstrates that the Commissioners did not provide 
adequate statutory safeguards for tenants against landlords who desire to 
include a more favorable holdover provision in the lease. Furthermore, it 
appears this lack of statutory paternalism was intentional. But the 
discussion cannot end there because rationales exist that support the 
harshness of the holdover rule, and the strong interests of the landlord and 
incoming tenant may warrant a provision such as section 4.301(c). The 
customary justification for the holdover rule and, more specifically, for the 
landlord’s unilateral election, is that it ultimately operates for the benefit 
of tenants as a class by its tendency to ensure the current tenant departs 
promptly.225 This is a commendable goal; surely one signing a lease does 
not forecast that their possession will be put off by a lingering tenant. By 
adopting the English Rule for delivery of possession, URLTA endorses the 
early view of Coe v. Clay that an incoming tenant should not have to 
gamble with the “chance at a lawsuit.”226 In this regard, implicit within 
URLTA’s holdover scheme is a considerable deterrence component. The 
threat of being held to another term, in theory, should dissuade the tenant 
from holding over, thus ensuring the availability of the property for the 
incoming tenant. This ground has been criticized, however, because 
deterrence “is burdened by the requirement that it is only valid if the 
tenant knows of his [or her] liabilities,” and it is questionable whether 
requisite notice takes place in the majority of cases.227 Without meaningful 
notice, there is no heightened incentive to vacate on time, at which point 
justification for the rule falls back to a penalty theory.228 The Restatement 
(Second) admits that without notice, the unilateral election is only 
“designed to protect the legitimate interests of the landlord.”229 Thus, there 
is a problem with the rationale for the rule.  
 
 
 224. See supra note 71. 
 225. See supra notes 97–115 and accompanying text.  
 226. Coe v. Clay, (1829) 130 Eng. Rep. 1131, 1131 (Ct. Common Pleas). 
 227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.4 (1977) (Introductory 
Note). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id.  
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Putting that aside for a moment, even if we assume that URLTA’s 
holdover scheme serves a legitimate deterrence purpose in the case where 
there is an incoming tenant, in practice the election will rarely, if ever, be 
used in that situation. For if the landlord includes a statutory defeating 
provision and the tenant holds over, because URLTA embraces the 
English Rule for delivery of possession, there are only two discrete 
circumstances in which the landlord will make the election to hold the 
tenant to a new term. To reach this conclusion, begin with the following 
premise: “While the landlord is almost always in the best position to 
prevent the lessee from holding over under a residential lease, he [or she] 
should not do so if holding over would yield an efficient outcome.”230 
Although the landlord’s failure to deliver possession to the incoming 
tenant is a breach, it will be an economically efficient and rational course 
of action if the future rents from the holdover tenant outweigh the costs of 
the breach. As noted, the costs of the breach in the form of actual and 
compensatory damages are likely to be nominal. However, section 
2.104(b) creates an additional disincentive for breach by allowing the 
incoming tenant to recover the greater of three months’ rent or threefold 
the actual damages sustained and reasonable attorney fees when the failure 
to deliver possession is willful and not in good faith.231 As a result, the 
prospect of paying a sum equal to triple rent plus attorney fees creates a 
powerful incentive for the landlord not to exercise the holdover election.232 
Thus, it is primarily section 2.104(b), and not the threat of being held to 
another term by way of section 4.301(c), that ensures the premises will 
nearly always be open for an incoming tenant. A landlord will rarely use 
the election when there is an incoming tenant because “there is almost 
never an efficient outcome when a residential tenant holds over.”233 A 
landlord instead has an incentive to quickly initiate removal proceedings, 
and the incoming tenant might be put out of possession for a few days, 
while the holdover tenant becomes liable for damages.234 This is a positive 
outcome; the end goal of having open premises is achieved by less drastic 
 
 
 230. Heiser, supra note 138, at 191.  
 231. See supra note 215. 
 232. Also clearly the time and effort required to litigate creates additional disincentives.  
 233. Heiser, supra note 138, at 191 (making statement in regard to jurisdictions where the English 
Rule for delivery of possession is utilized).  
 234. See URLTA § 4.301(c) (“[T]he landlord may bring an action for possession and . . . may also 
recover an amount not more than [3] month’s periodic rent or [threefold] the actual damages sustained 
by him, whichever is greater, and reasonable attorney’s fees.”); URLTA § 2.103(“At the 
commencement of the term a landlord shall deliver possession of the premises to the tenant [and] may 
bring an action for possession against any person wrongfully in possession and may recover the 
damages provided in Section 4.301(c).”).  
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means than binding the holdover tenant to a new term, and the incoming 
tenant is able to secure actual possession at a not-too-distant future time. If 
the overriding concern is that the premises will be open, section 2.104(b) 
makes sections 4.301(c) and 1.401(d) superfluous deterrence measures. 
Yet the landlord’s election remains. The problem with strongly 
discouraging landlords from creating holdover tenancies when there is an 
incoming tenant, yet giving the landlord the unilateral right to create such 
tenancies, is that landlords will only utilize the election when there is no 
incoming tenant or when there is an incoming tenant but a falling rental 
market.235 Without an incoming tenant, the idea that sections 4.301(c) and 
1.401(d) remain viable as beneficial to tenants as a class is a legal fiction. 
However, this is the prime situation in which the election will be 
exercised. With no concern over an incoming tenant and breach, the 
landlord would jump at the opportunity to bind an unwitting holdover 
tenant, thus securing another year’s rent. Any negligible penalty 
justification that exists for this result is vastly outweighed by the severity 
of the sanction on the individual tenant,236 and no substantial interest is 
furthered other than the landlord’s interest in securing a continuous stream 
of rental income.  
URLTA’s policy of enabling, if not encouraging, landlords to 
selectively engage in rental arbitrage at the expense of important 
countervailing interests is striking. Again, the problem is with the rationale 
for the rule. The holdover tenant’s interest in equity is discarded, and, 
more fundamentally, such a policy advances no discernible benefit for 
tenants as a class—the chief and perhaps only legitimate justification for 
allowing the holdover rule in the first place. Nearly one hundred years ago, 
one commentator identified the hypocrisy of allowing landlords to impose 
this penalty upon unwilling tenants in an otherwise tenant-friendly 
country, stating: 
It is somewhat surprising that the courts of this country, which have 
ordinarily shown a desire to mould the law in favor of the tenant 
rather than the landlord, should have originated and generally 
adopted [the unilateral landlord election], the tendency of which is, 
 
 
 235. For the landlord to rationally opt to bind the holdover tenant in the falling market scenario, 
the sum of the incoming tenant’s rent would have to be at least one dollar less than the sum of the 
holdover’s rent for the holdover period less the cost of the breach. By way of illustration, assume both 
the holdover and incoming tenant have lease terms of 12 months. Then 12x must be less than 12y–z, 
where x is equal to the incoming tenant’s rental rate, y is equal to the holdover tenant’s rental rate, and 
z is equal the cost of the breach. Presumably, this would require a substantial drop in rental rates.  
 236. Cf. SCHOSHINKSI, supra note 4, at 72.  
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in many cases, to operate with considerable severity upon a tenant 
who is disposed promptly to relinquish possession but is 
accidentally prevented from doing so.237 
This statement was made long before any grumblings about a 
revolution in landlord-tenant law took place. Thus, it is all the more 
surprising that the drafters of URLTA, a flagship reform written at the 
very crux of a revolution in which tenants’ legal protections were 
increasing by leaps and bounds, would craft a rule that tends not only to 
operate with considerable severity upon an individual tenant but also to 
operate in such as way so as to further no beneficial interest of tenants 
anywhere.  
It seems there is no good reason for giving the landlord this election at 
all. In sum, section 2.104(b) nullifies the need for the election as 
deterrence protection for incoming tenants; any remaining rationale for the 
landlord’s election is itself but a holdover from the common law, the only 
result of which is to further the landlord’s economic interest. To borrow 
from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, it appears somewhat “revolting to 
have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the 
time of Henry IV [and] more revolting if the grounds upon which it was 
laid down have vanished . . . and the rule simply persists from blind 
imitation of the past.”238 
III. PROPOSAL 
There are modifications to URLTA’s holdover system that could 
preserve the landlord’s interest in rental income while, importantly, 
striking a better balance between the interests of the holdover and 
incoming tenants, and also better achieving equilibrium between certainty 
and equity. This Note suggests primarily that URLTA’s default unilateral 
election contained within section 4.301(c) be done away with. In reaching 
this conclusion, brief application to both holdover situations—where there 
is an incoming tenant and where there is not—is needed. In the case of the 
former, note that URLTA’s current system, absent the unilateral election, 
already provides adequate protections to both landlords and incoming 
tenants. Once again, section 2.103 requires the landlord to evict the 
holdover tenant while allowing him or her to recover damages from that 
tenant, and sections 4.102(a) and (b) make the landlord liable to the 
 
 
 237. 2 TIFFANY, supra note 88, at 1471–72. 
 238. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).  
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incoming tenant for damages if possession is not delivered. The threat of 
the holdover election is unnecessary in this circumstance because adequate 
pressure is already applied to the landlord to evict and to the tenant to 
vacate. This is substantially similar in effect to a double-rent statute. Here, 
instead, the potential liability is a lump-sum payable from holdover to 
landlord, and another lump-sum payable from landlord to incoming tenant. 
If the tenant holds over unintentionally, the incoming tenant is allowed to 
cancel the lease after too long a wait. And in that case, section 2.102 
shields the landlord from liability if eviction proceedings are brought 
because failure to deliver possession must be willful and not in good faith. 
Again, the end goal of having open premises is achieved by less drastic 
means than binding the holdover tenant to a new term, and the incoming 
tenant is able to secure actual possession at a not-too-distant future time.  
In the latter case where there is no incoming tenant, the landlord’s 
default unilateral election should be removed because no important 
interest is served by allowing landlords to bind tenants to a new term. 
Here, any additional term should arise by agreement of the parties.239 If 
the tenant remains with no intent to extend the lease, the tenant should 
simply be liable for prorated rent for the time of holding over. This allows 
the landlord to maintain the status quo until a new tenant is found, or, 
alternatively, until a new lease is signed with the current tenant. The tenant 
that remains behind will be able to take extra time, sometimes 
unavoidable,240 to vacate the premises, but must pay for that privilege. If 
the tenant continues to pay rent in expectation of extending the lease and 
the landlord accepts, a month-to-month tenancy should apply, not by the 
landlord’s election, but by the payment and acceptance of rent. If the 
landlord does not accept the payment as an extension of the lease, 
proceedings to evict should be brought in a reasonable time and the tenant 
will remain liable for the reasonable rent during occupation. In sum, where 
there is no incoming tenant, a modified consent approach should govern, 
more consistent with general contract principles. The parties are always 
free to sign a new lease, but in the absence of such an agreement the tenant 
will remain liable for prorated rent, unless the tenant pays rent and the 
landlord accepts as an extension of the lease, at which point a month-to-
month tenancy will arise.  
Even after omitting the landlord’s default election, the problem of the 
form lease remains. As noted previously, even in those states that have 
 
 
 239. Of course, problems also arise with what constitutes adequate manifestation of intent. See 
supra note 94 and accompanying text.  
 240. See, e.g., Mason v. Wierengo’s Estate, 71 N.W. 489 (Mich. 1897).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1287 Sullivan book Pages.doc9/24/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
1324 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1287 
 
 
 
 
abrogated the holdover rule through double-rent statutes, or in those that 
call for a month-to-month tenancy in all cases, an agreement reached 
through lease provision or otherwise can trump the statutory holdover 
resolution. Due to the disparity of bargaining power between the parties, 
greater legislative paternalism may be warranted to protect tenants from 
overreaching landlords. Although a landlord’s year-to-year holdover 
provision in a lease is unlikely to be exercised when there is an incoming 
tenant, it would be nearly impossible to determine ex ante whether an 
incoming tenant will in fact be present on the date of expiration. Thus, a 
bright-line rule prohibiting lease provisions that allow a holdover term in 
excess of month-to-month is necessary. Such a rule integrated into 
URLTA’s system would eliminate the risk that a holdover tenant will be 
bound in the absence of an incoming tenant. It would also virtually 
eliminate that small class of cases in which a landlord might bind a 
holdover tenant even when there is an incoming tenant due to a falling 
rental market. Presumably, in this latter situation, the rental rate to which 
the holdover tenant would be bound would be substantially higher than the 
prevailing market rate, resulting in an unwilling tenant being bound to an 
unreasonable rental rate. In addition, nothing suggested here alters the 
ability of the landlord and tenant to later agree to a new term if both find it 
in their interests to do so.  
These suggestions are an attempt to better capture the result the 
Commissioners should have been striving for. Eliminating the landlord’s 
unilateral election leaves adequate protections for the incoming tenant 
while removing the risk of a holdover being bound in the absence of an 
incoming tenant. In addition, adopting per se unenforceability of lease 
terms creating a holdover term greater than month-to-month protects 
tenants from the heavy-handed bargaining power of landlords.  
CONCLUSION 
The law of landlord and tenant is an area that has been literally 
revolutionized, with huge momentum building in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. Despite laudable gains to tenants’ rights, the obligations of the 
holdover tenant nevertheless remain. Although URLTA’s provisions 
addressing holdover tenants appear to embrace the thrust of this revolution 
and mitigate the common-law doctrine by providing for the creation of a 
month-to-month tenancy in the majority of cases, in theory and in practice 
section 4.301(c) frustrates the Act’s overall purpose by leaving many 
undesirable characteristics of the common-law system in place. Section 
4.301(c) has no teeth because sophisticated (and perhaps not-so-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/23
p 1287 Sullivan book Pages.doc9/24/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] COMMON LAW, URLTA, AND THE HOLDOVER TENANT 1325 
 
 
 
 
sophisticated) landlords can nullify its effects by writing it out of the lease, 
and, in addition, are motivated to do so. Landlords in URLTA jurisdictions 
are able to manipulate leases in such a way as to write in an enforceable, 
landlord-friendly holdover provision, and then selectively enforce that 
provision only when economically beneficial. Because of this, the 
holdover rule ceases to function in its proper role. No longer will it even 
arguably work for the benefit of tenants as a class, but instead it will 
become yet another item in the landlord’s bag of tricks. In the end, section 
4.301(c) is not revolutionary but devolutionary. Only by providing 
increased tenant protections from overreaching landlords, consistent with 
the rest of the Act, can URLTA cease to be hypocritical in the holdover 
context and become more genuine in its role as a flagship reform.  
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